Dewey's aesthetic theory. by Hollander, Ruth
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Theses & Dissertations Dissertations and Theses (pre-1964)
1959
Dewey's aesthetic theory.
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/15029
Boston University
• 
-
BOSTON UNIVERSITY 
GRADUATE SCHOOL 
Thesis 
DEWEY'S AESTHET~C THEORY 
by 
Ruth Hellander 
(A.B., Wheaton College, 1958) 
Submitted in partial fUlfilment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Master of Arts 
1959 
• 
• 
/-}-171 
!959 
IJo/ 
APPROVED 
by 
First Reader ~J. ~ '.lkul ~ 
Professor of Philosophy 
.. ~ 
Assistant Professor of Philosophy 
ii 
• 
• ..
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter Page 
I. INTRODUCTION 
1. The Problem of the Thesis • • • • • • • • • • 
Limitations • • • • • • • • • • • 0 • • • • • 
The Methodology of the Thesis 
• • • • • • • • 
Historical Perspective • • • • • • • • • • • 
i. Peirce's Scientific Method . .. . I! • • • 
ii. James'' s: Pragmatic Method, . . .. . . , . . 
1 
1 
2 
3 
4 
6 
II. DEWEY'S METHODOLOGY 
1. Experience as Method 0- • • • . .. . . . . . • 13 
i. Primary Experience • • • • • • • • • 13 
ii. Experience and experiencing • • • • • • • 15 
iii. nAny" experience in contrast· 
to "An" experience • • • • ,. • • • • • • 16 
Experience as Subject-Matter • • ... • 23 
i. Definitions o • • . . . .. • • • • • • • • 23 
ii~ Meaning and Works of Art • • • • • • •• 24 
iii. Intellect, Volition, and Emotion 
'Dhe Significance of Art • • • • 
• • • 
•••• 30 
••• " 48 
III. DEWEY'S THEORY OF CRITICAL JUDGMENT 
1. A.esthetic Critic ism .• • • • • • • • • • • • • 54 
iii 
• ..
iv 
Chapter Page 
IV. 
2 .... 
i. Judicial Judgment • .. • • • • • • • • 55 
ii. Impressionist Judgment • • 
The Question of Means and Ends 
. . . . • • 
• • • • • • 
58 
60 
i. Art Objects as Final and Instrumental. 60 
ii. Values as Instrumental and Final . . .. 
iii. The Artistic and the Aesthetic • • • • 
66 
69 
71 
73 
74 
74 
76 
78 
81 
84 
iv. Fine and Practical Art • • • • • • • • 
v. The Question of Uniqueness • • • • • • 
3. The Judgmental Process • • • • • • • • . • 
i. Recognition and Perception • • • • • • 
ii. The Nature of Criteria of Judgment • • 
iii. Psychical Distance • . . • .. • • • • • 
iv. Analysis and Synthesis • • • . • • • • 
4. C.ritical Reconstruction • • • • • • • . • 
i. The Similarity of Process or Method. • 84 
ii. Philosophy'as Creative, 
Imaginative Reconstruction • 
A RECAPITULATION 
1. Ambiguity and Incoherence • • • 
i. Experience • • • • • • • • • 
ii. ttArt as Experience" • • • . 
iii. Gontextualism • • • • • • • 
2:. T,he Emotional Mode of Response • 
3. The Problem of Unity . • • • • . 
• • • • • 86 
• • • • • 89 
• • • • • 90 
• • • • • 94 
• • • • • 97 
• • • . • 102 
• • • • • 111 
• 
• ..
Chapter 
v. 
i. The Fallacy of 
Artificial Simplification • • • a • • • 
ii. The Permanence of Value • • • • . .. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • . . . • • CONCLUSIONS • 
BIBLIOGRAPHY • * • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
ABSTRACT • • • • • • t • • • • It: • • • • • • • 
v 
Page 
114 
116 
119 
126 
130 
• 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1. The Problem of the Thesis 
The problem of this thesis is to clarify Dewey's con-
cept of aesthetic experience and attempt to show the signi-
ficance of aesthetic factors for experience in general. 
Thus, the general aspects of experience will be contrasted 
with a focus on their relatedness in qualifiedly aesthetic 
experiences. Along these same lines, an attempt will be 
made to show how nann experience may be distinguished from 
any ordinary experience. Further, an examination of Dewey's 
theory of critical judgment will be made, both with regard 
to aesthetically qualified experiences and to the general 
subject of philosophical nreconstructionn. As the study 
proceeds, there will be many attempts to clarify some of 
the vague definitions and inconsistencies to be found in 
Dewey's philosophic concepts, specifically those which re-
late to his aesthetic theory. 
2. Limitations 
Only those major books which are directly concerned 
with Dewey's concept of experience or have a particular 
bearing on his aesthetic theory or method of critical judg-
ment will be treated. It will be necessary to neglect much 
1 
•• 
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of the educational, social, political and logical writings 
of this prolific philosopher for the sake of continuity and 
coherence. 1 
The study is further limited in that the emphasis will 
be on clarifying and restating Dewey's position, concentra-
ting on the strengths and reserving comments on the weak-
nesses for the critical evaluation at the end of the paper. 
3. The Methodology of the Thesis 
The problem will be developed in four main stages: 
first, an examination of Dewey's empiricism as a method for 
inquiry with regard to the nature of experience in general, 
and specifically with respect to aesthetic experience; sec-
-ondly, the relationship, within the aesthetic context or 
situation, between the objective work of art and the perci-
pient; thirdly, the nature and function of critical judgments 
as they are recreative for aesthetic experience in particular 
and reconstructive for philosophy in general; and, finally, 
a critical eva~uation of Dewey's aesthetic theory which will 
endeavor to bring to light the negative elements and ambi-
guities and discuss possible alternatives to this position. 
1. Irwin Edman takes important notice of the ultimate sig-
nificance of aesthetic experience and art for all of 
Dewey's thought in his article "Dewey and Art," John Dewey: 
Philosopher of Science and Freedom, ed. Sidney Hook (New 
York: Dial Press, 1950, p. 48, where he states: "It re-
quired the publication of Art As Experience to spell out 
for a good many readers the lesson that, far from neglecting 
or ignoring the claims of art, art was the illustration par 
.excellence for Dewey of the ultimate meaning of intelligence, 
morals, democracy, education, and even ••• the nature of 
things." 
.3 
4. Historical Perspective 
Although Pragmatism has become a distinctively American 
philosophy, its roots may be traced back to earlier thinkers. 
Dewey says that Charles Sanders Peirce derived the term from 
Kant's Metaphysics of Morals, where Kant distinguishes the 
'practical' from the 'pragmatic .. '! Elsewhere it is stated: 
-. 
"He was most influenced by Kant; who had, he thought, raised 
all the relevant philosophical problems, but from whom he 
diff'ered on almost every solution."2 
Dewey feels that a significant difference between the 
two philosophers is that Peirce develops Kant's views ex-
perimentally rather than ~ priori, or interprets the univer-
sality of concepts in the realm of experience just as Kant 
had tried to establish the law of practical reason in the 
domain of the .!. priori • .3 
While Peirce has roots in German Kantian philosophy, 
Dewey discusses the fact that James was primarily influenced 
by British empiricism. 
1. 
2. 
Pragmatism thus presents itself as an extension 
of historical empiricism, but with this funda-
mental difference, that it does not insist upon 
antecedent phenomena but upon consequent pheno-
mena; not upon the precefents but upon the possi-
bilities of action • .. • · 
See John Dewey, Philosophy and Civilization (New York: 
Minton, Balch & do., l9.3l , pp. 1.3-.35. 
Dagobert D. Runes (ed.-), Dictionary of Philosophy (Ames: 
Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1956); p. 227. . 
.3. Dewey, op. cit., p. 15 .. 
-4 
The evolution of modern American Pragmatism reveals a 
strong line of relatedness in the development of the re-
spective thinking of Charles s. Peirce, William James, and 
John Dewey. Although these men had several personal and 
philosophical· differences, there does seem to be an indi-
cation that they desired to construct a consistent philo-
sophy. Further, neverything else in the main stream f§J 
American philosop~ seems to be either derived from or a 
continuation of the work of these three men.nl 
i. Peirce's Scientific Method 
Of vital significance for succeeding thought is Peirce's 
use of the scientific method of inquiry and its implications 
for epistemology. For him, rational thinking takes place 
within the framework of experience, and the philosopher must 
proceed by a method of scientific investigation and logical 
inquiry. Concepts and beliefs arise out of particular expe-
riences of settled doubt, and are relative to the given in-
quiry. Concepts may be valid, though not necessarily true, 
for absolute truth is attainable only at the conclusion of 
all possible inquiry, and must be universally agreeable. 
Thought is primarily a means for discovering good guiding 
principles for purposive actiqn. 2 
1. 
2. 
William Savery, "The Significance of Dewey's Philosophy,n 
The Philosophy of John Dewey, ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp 
(Chicago: Northwestern University,,l939), p. 483. 
Charles s. Peirce "How to Make Our Idea~ Clear," Classic 
American Philosopbers, ed. Max H. Fisch \New York; Apple-
ton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1951), pp. 70-87. 
• 
• 
Despite their differences of opinion, these three 
philosophers endeavored to cement Pragmatic philosophy in 
5 
a spirit of friendliness. In a letter to James, Peirce says: 
Though I am so bound up in my narrow methods 
as often to lament that you could not furnish 
me with the' exact forms that I· am skilled with 
dealing with, yet I see mys~lf, with admiration 
and wonder, how you, nevertheless; come to the 
right conclusions in most cases •••• What is 
uti~ity, if it is confined to a single acci-
dental person? Truth is public.l 
Here Peirce emphasizes his particular opinions on public 
verifiability and methodology, but certainly in a tone 
of compatibility with James. 
Regardless of the fact that Peirce hypothesizes the 
infinite end of reality, what is extremely important for 
him is the practical explanation of truth and error in 
relation to scientific inquiry.as philosophic method. This 
methodology strongly influenced Dewey 1 s thinking. 2 
One of the foremost exponents of scientific 
method was John Dewey • • • ffihsiJ called for 
a reexamination of philosophic problems in 
the light o~ the results and methodology of 
modern science. The search for absolute truths 
and for.in£allible guides to human action was 
to be abandoned.3 
1. Ralph Barton Perry,_ The Thought·and.Character of William 
James, (Boston:. Little·, Brown & Co., 1935), Vol. II, 
P• 43 • 
2. Cf. Dewey 1 s·The Quest.For Certainty (New York: Minton, 
Balch & Co., 1929), passim. ·. 
3. Jack Ka.rqj.nsky, . ttDewey' s Concept of An Experience, tt · 
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XVII, No. 3 
(March, 1957}, 316. 
• 
6 
Thus, the history begins with the hypothetical element 
which Peirce conceives to be of the nature of truth, and 
conceivable effects become the totality of our concepts of 
things. Truth, for all three men, loses its qualities of 
absoluteness and ultimacy and becomes part of the scienti-
fic process of experimentation, a kind of hypothesis upon 
which to .construct purposive lines of action in a logical, 
inductive, inferential manner. 
ii. James's Pragmatic Method 
rrJames attributed his pragmatic' theory of knowledge 
and its name to Charles s. Peirce nl and one of their basic 
' ' 
differences is that where Peirce emphasized the importance 
of a "community of discourse," James' primary concern was 
with the individual. As Dewey says: "Peirce was above all 
a logician; whereas James was an.educator and humanist."2 
Less interested in describing scientific method than 
Peirce, James dealt with the problem of knowledge and its 
ramifications for thought.3 Once again, however, concep-
tual truth is to be determined by its approximate pre-
dictability for future experiencing. 
One might say that Dewey.was deeply concerned with 
both the logical and the humanistic aspects of philosophical 
L. Ralph Barton Perry, Philosophy of the Recent.Past (New 
York: Charl.es Scribner's Sons, 1926)-, p. 189. 
2. Dewey, Philosophy and Civilization, p. 19. 
J. Cf. James' Pragmatism (New York: Longmans, Green & Co.,· 
1914), passim.· · 
• 
• 
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thinking. He states a common principle when he speaks o£ 
thought, not as "an end or finality ••• but the starting 
point of new desires, aims, and plans.nl All three would 
concur in a basic distrust of ttthe elevation of the ob-
server above his environment.n2 
Even where James and Dewey dif£er, they do attempt 
to reconcile their diversities so as to present a consis-
tent front to the critics of Pragmatism. 
So long as the great disputation over prag-
matism was on, their controversial front 
against the common foe was seamless. Each 
took pains to assert his unqualified agree-
ment with the other and each so reinterpre-
ted points o£ possible differences as to 
validate his own assent.3 
Here is an explicit and, it would seem, valid statement 
regarding the intention of the American pragmatists to 
construct a consistent doctrine. 
Though these three thinkers were certainly independent, 
individual men, sharing common ideas and aims while their 
roots often diverged, it does seem worthy of note that they 
had a sense of "mission," a feeling of mutuality in the 
philosophic venture. Through their sympathetic interactions 
we see a genuine attempt to solidify Pragmatism as a new, 
1. 
2. 
John Dewey, Albert Barnes, et al., Art And Education 
(Merion, Pa: The Barnes Foundation Press, 1929), p. 183. 
Herbert W. Schneider, Introduction to M.H. Thomas, 
Bibliography of John Dewe;y: (2d ed. rev.; New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1939), p. xviii • 
• 
• 
uniquely American method of thought. 
The new method of philosophy, both as critical 
and constructive instrument, which Peirce began, 
was developed to some extent by William James 
and was carried out practically to its full 
critical and constructive methodological limits 
by Dewey.l. 
1. John Dewey's Philosophy: Intelligence in the Modern 
World, ed. Joseph Ratner {New York: Random House, Inc., 
1939}, PP• 44-45n. 
-• 
CHAPTER II 
DEWEY'S METHODOLOGY 
Dewey's empiricism is influenced by both Peirce and James, 
though what emerges as distinctively his own thought is a much 
broader conception of the subject-matter of inquiry, or expe-
rience. It might be significant to note that Dewey, like 
Peirce, considers modern scientific methods and procedures 
to be of great importance for phiiosophy, though the realm of 
philosophical inquiry is more inclusive, being concerned with 
~ of experience.1 For Dewey, a proper empiricism keeps us 
from committing the 'simplicist' or 'exclusionist' fallacy 
through a natural dialectic attained by a method which considers 
all factors of experience relevant to inquiry. Thus, "the adop-
tion of empirical method procures for philosophic reflection some-
thing of that cooperative tendency toward consensus Las it does 
for Peirc~ which marks inquiry in the natural sciences."2 
Scientific method is not, however, synonymous with philosophi-
cal empiricism, but merely serves as "an analogy • • • for 
1. 
2. 
Dewey would say that philosophy itself is not ultimate, 
in the sense that it too must serve experience as lived 
by man, 'the live creature' interacting or transacting 
with nature, the environment. Philesophy, properly con-
ceived, must not be abstracted from the context of life. 
As Dewey states: "There is a special service which the 
study of philosophy may render. Empirically pursued it 
Will not be a study of philosophy but a study, by means 
of philosophy, of life-experience." John Dewey, Experience 
and Nature (Baltimore: Waverly Press, 1925), p. 37. 
Hereinafter this book will be referred to as ~· 
!Qll.' p. 30. 9 
• 
• 
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philosophy.nl The same principles are used, but the f'ield 
of applicability is much broader arid more fundamental for 
philosophy. 
Dewey is scrupulous in his use of empiricism, and, 
like James, is concerned with .the question of the practi-
cal consequences of' methodology for philosophy in general. 
Again, with respect to his notion of experience, Dewey notes 
and accepts James' insistence thatit is a ffdouble-barrelJ:.ed 
word.tt 
It includes what men do and suffer; what they 
strive for, love, believe and endure, and also 
how men act and are acted upon, the ways in 
which they do and suffer, desire·and enjoy, 
see, believe, imagine - in short, processes 
of experiencing.2 
-· 
Although the final interpretation of 'experience' differs 
in many respects for these two men, there is no doubt that 
their emphases are mutually on an expanding notion of ex-
perience for all aspects of life. 
Dewey's polemic against traditional philosophies must 
not be seen as a purely negative assault upon the validity 
of ideas; rather, his antagonism is directed to our modern-
day reliance upon them as well as the readiness with which 
we accept the expressed principles without further testing 
or experimentation. -This represents a 'cultural lag' in 
the realm of philosophy, and far from being adverse to tradi-
·1. Ibid., p_. Jl • 
2.· Ibid., p~. 8. 
• 
• 
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tional thinking Dewey assumes the importance of such evi-
dence for philosophy, but in terms of present and future 
application and verifiability by thoughtful experiential 
processes. For Dewey, empirical method must make a real 
difference for philosophical inquiry, and for this reason 
he presents the traditional systems of thought in contra-
distinction to his own empirical procedure, to point out 
methodological fallacies. Empiricism is a more fruitful 
means of investigation of experience, but before discussing 
in brief Deweyts specific methodology it is important that 
we note those fallacies which he ascribes to traditional 
philosophies. There are basically three: 
The complete separation of subject and object 
(of what is experienced from how it is expe-
rienced); the exaggeration of the features of 
known objects at the expense of the-qualities 
of objects of enjoyment and trouble, friend-
ship and human association, art and industry; 
and the exclusive isolation of the results of 
various types of selective simplification which 
are undertaken for diverse unavowed purposes.l 
We neglect the very process of historical advancement, 
or progress in other fields such as the scientific, when we 
rely on ancient systems of philosophy to solve the present-
day complexities of our changing experience. Past history 
differed from that of the modern world, and thought revolved 
around the problems which men had to face at the times when 
their situations warranted such thinking. We live in our 
particular hi.stor:Lcal framework and must deal with our lives 
1. Ibid., P• 32. 
• 
•• 
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and thoughts accordingly, given the obvious benefit o.f the 
cumulative experiences o.f the past which we must, in turn, 
reevaluate and critically adjust to our needs. 
Two things have rendered possible a new con-
ception o.f experience and a new conception 
o.f the relation o.f reason to experience, or, 
more accurately, o.f the place o.f reason ~ 
experience. The primary .factor is the change 
that has taken place in the actual nature o.f 
experience, its contents and methods, as it 
is actually lived. T.he other is the develop-
ment o.f a psychology based upon biology which 
makes possible a new scientific .formulation 
o.f the nature o.f experience. 
Thus, modern living necessitates changes, not only in 
scientific method, but .for philosophical inquiry as well. 
Traditional thought is a product o.f past experiencing and 
answered to needs which are possibly no longer salient in 
modern li.fe. We live in a more highly complex, individual-
ized society, and while the existing philosophical systems 
may be critically used as instruments, they must not be 
relied on to provide us with ready-made answers for our 
experiences. Psychology, biology, and scientific method, 
with all their ramifications .for li.fe have altered the 
character o.f our experience, and philosophy must expand and 
develop so as to include new evidence and meet present needs. 
Seen in this light, Dewey is not attempting to destroy the 
validity o.f traditional thinking, but rather to wean us away 
.from its pervasive influence on present day li.fe. 
1. John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York: 
The New American Library, l955), P• 81. Hereinafter 
this book will be referred to as RIP. 
-- -
• 
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1. Experience as Method 
There are three crucial and recurring themes throughout 
Dewey's writings; namely, "experience," "nature," and "inteJ)i-
gence." The manner in which he uses these words is quite 
distinct, .for he "departs .from the more narrow usage o.f an 
older empiricism, giving the idea o.f experience a much more 
.fundamental and significant status .. n1 The reason .for Dewey's 
.finding such a clear analogy for philosophy in scientific 
procedures is the very fact that in the natural sciences it 
is habitual to "treat experience as the starting-point, and 
as method .for dealing with nature, and as the goal in which 
nature is disclosed .for what it is.n2 Empirical, experiential 
method in philosophical inquiry must also begin, work through, 
and end with experience. However, we must turn to certain 
distinctions regarding experience as it immediately occurs in 
brute sense response and as enriched and consummated in 
aesthetic experience. 
i. Primary Experience 
"This consideration of method may suitably begin with 
the contrast between gross, macroscopic, crude subject-
matters in primary experience and the refined, derived objects 
of reflection.n3 We must begin with nthe obvious and im-
mediate facts of gross experience,n4 or in the 'shining 
1. 
2 • 
H.S. Thayer, The Logic o.f Pragmatism (New York: The 
Humanities Press, 1952), p. 19. 
Dewey, ~' p. 1. 
Ibid.' pp. 3-4. 
Ibid. 
-
• 
• 
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present. •1 
Anxious, as always, to dissolve those common distinc-
tions between various modes of life and thought, Dewey states: 
"The value of experience • • • is that it serves as a con-
stant reminder of something which is neither exclusive and 
isolated subject or object, .matter or mind, nor yet one plus 
the other.n2 Experience denotes the "fulness of undivided 
meaning" of "inclusive integrity," and empirical method is 
the only one which takes adequate recognition of the whole-
~ess of the basic, primary experience. According to Dewey, 
other, non-empirical methods "begin with results of a re-
flection that has already torn in two the subject-matter 
experienced and the operations and states of experiencing."3 
"Primary" or "crude" experience is the starting point, but 
"a bare event is no event at- all; something happens.~4 What 
it is that happens, and how it happens are integral to the 
experience as it becomes subject to reflection and study. 
1. 
2. 
See E.S. Brightman Person and Reality (New York: The 
Ronald Press, 1958~, pp. 34-74. Dewey devotes a great 
deal of space to this non-reflectional type of experience 
in the introduction to·Essazs in Exberimental Logic (New 
York: Dover Publications, Inc., -_191 ) -in which he speaks 
of the 'shiningly apparent' within experience~£ immediacy. 
Dewey, EAN, p. 28. 
3. ~., p. 9. Perhaps it might be well to note that Dewey 
conceives of experience as a sort of Hegelian synthesis, 
in that eac~ experience had, when studied and analyzed by 
critical intelligence becomes itself the beginning for new 
and richer modes of experiencing • 
4. Ibid., p. 1. 
• 
• 
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ii. Experience and experiencing 
In the immediacy of our experiencing there can be no 
clear-cut distinctions made; rather, subject and object are 
so integrated that only in the subsequent stage of reflec-
tive thought are such distinctions disclosed. Only after 
the event or situation of experiencing can one abstract 
for thought and speak about the constituent elements or 
· component parts of an experience. Real or valid disclo-
sures of this sort can neither be observed nor defined in 
the actual experiential process. 
At the outset we have only the materials of present 
experienc~, but this does not mean that direct or imme-
diately 'had' experiences are thereby more real; rather, 
they are the beginning and end of inquiry, for in reflec-
tion we deal with diverse possibilities and judgments about 
our experiences in order to make them more valuable :for 
future experiencing and subsequent reflection. 
Moreover, even the bare notion of experience, in most 
instances, denotes more than just an interaction between 
man and his environment. Something does indeed happen, and 
though we do not immediately know intellectually what it is, 
the context is full and rich with meaning to varying degrees, 
and there is a pervasive qualitative aspect unifying the 
experience. The important thing is that experience is a 
"context ffihic!J includes both knower and known, ttl and this 
1. Thayer, The Logic of Pragmatism, p. 26. Stephen Pepper, 
in his book The Basis of Criticism in the Arts, classi-
fies Dewey as a 'contextualist,' which will be more fully 
discussed later on in this paper. 
• 
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provides us with a means for distinguishing between expe-
rience as context, inclusive and integrated, or the subject-
matter for subsequent inquiry, and experiencing, or the 
diverse modes human beings use in order to get at parti-
cular subject-matters. Of course, "the two are intimately 
related since experiencing itself is a fact of experience,"1 
and the final means for distinguishing is a qualitative 
differentia, the 'howt or the particular mode of expe-
riencing within a given context or experience. This takes 
us closer to the aesthetic question, for it is this mode 
of experiencing which is richest for life, and any expe-
rience which is pervaded by aesthetic quality is thereby 
"an" experience of vital significance, meaning, and value. 
iii. "Anyn experience in contrast to ttAn" experience 
Experiences may be differentiated not according to kinds, 
but in terms of degrees of intensity and organization, etc. 
The general flow of experience, uncontrolled and unre-
reflected is constituted of ordinary ongoings, and primi-
tive, naive ebb of any experiential sequence. This kind 
of experience which is disorganized and lacks the control 
of intelligent critical reflection for selection and· 
guidance towards appropriate materials, is unqualified by 
the aesthetic and lacks the quality which makes for the 
real, vital, and significant moments in our lives. How-
ever, the elements involved are similar in all experiencing. 
1. Ibid., p. 30. 
-17 
There are certain conditions that are able to give greater 
meaning and qual1ty to the interactions of the live creature 
and his environment• These same conditions also promote the 
functions of the emotions, intellect, and will, or the diverse 
modes of experiential response. Dewey calls these conditions 
feeling-states of resistance and conflict, or periods in a 
life's process when the organism is caught up in tension or 
stress or blocked by obstacles. These problematic situations 
are the potential for real, vivid experiences. The question is, 
how are we to deal with them most fruitfully? 
Again, the difference seems to lie in the fact that in 
ordinary experiencing, the situation never achieves an appro-
priate resolution, due to strong emotions that either distract 
or mislead the intellect so that purposeful action is stifled; 
whereas, .@:.!! experienc-e exhibits the vitality and richness of 
completion and satisfaction attained through the transaction .. 
Life itself consists of phases in which the 
organism falls out of step with the march of 
surrounding things and then recovers unison 
with it • . • • and' in a growing life' the re-
covery is never mere return to a prior state, 
for it is enriched bY the state of disparity 
and resistance through which it has success-
fully passed. • • • Life grows when a temporary 
falling out is a transition to a more extensive 
balance of the energies of the organism with -1-those of the conditions under which it lives. 
A real experience contains the usual pattern of inter-
action, but is ultimately a felt-unity which we qualify as 
aesthetic. Only such iran1t experience truly promotes life, 
1.. John Dewey, Art As Experience (New York: Minton, Balch 
& Co. , 1934}, p.. 14. :gereinafter this book will be re-
ferred to·as AAE. · · 
. -
• 
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both as a significant terminus and as an instrument or means 
for broadening future experience. This type of experience is 
what distinguishes man from the other animals, for his life 
may be so punctuated by intelligently consummated, highly 
qualitative experiences. 
Each problem that is encountered demands a re-
examination of experience so as to include 
within it new material and a more inclusive 
resolution. The more man matures the more in-
tegrated he becomes.l 
For Dewey, as for James, the life process is continually 
expanding as experience is further enriched by new and more 
complex relationships which man establishes with his sur-
roundings. Each meaningful experience furthers the inte-
gration, and not only does man become something more than 
he was prior to such experience, but his world also expands 
and is enriched. However, the stability that is attained 
in these rare moments of intense living are "not stagnation 
but ••• rhythmic and developing ••• art in germ.u2 
Dewey attempts to explain the duality confronting the 
live creature who not only experiences finality and consum-
mation, but is also aware that the pulses of life's processes 
continue and do not ceas-e to operate within and without simply 
because a state of harmony has been achieved. There can be 
no pure finality, and once again Dewey asks us to realize 
that such distinctions are valid only for abstract thought. 
The importance of achieved equilibrium is to be seen in its 
effective ability to lead us back into richer experience. 
1. Kaminsky, "Dewey's Concept of An Experience, n p. 318. 
2. Dewey, AAE, p. 19. 
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Although Dewey never clearly or explicitly sets down 
the criteria f'or distinguishing between "any" ordinary ex-
perience and "an" experience, he does, by ostensive defini-
tion, indicate what these criteria might be. Before pur-
suing this distinction any further, it might be well to 
ask what Dewey hopes to accomplish by making such a dif-
ferentiation. 
Dewey is not concerned with a dichotomization of ex-
perience. Time and again he insists that "an" experience 
must follow on the heels of ordinary experiencing, or that 
"an" experience is a natural continuation of natural, or-
dinary processes. The difference is not in kinds of expe-
riences, but rather in degrees of organization, intensity, 
etc. "An" experience is a movement of' experience which 
organizes itself' in relationship to some end or interest 
of the particular organism. This movement exhibits con-
tinuous development and growth, and is consummated. A 
lif'e filled with such vivid experiences i~ one that is 
truly lived. Ordinarily, with the every-day pressures 
and hum-drum affairs of daily living, we merely subsist. 
Further, Dewey would insist that "no experience of whatever 
'sort is a unity unless it has aesthetic quality.nl Thus, 
it seems that every experience is "an" experience in so 
f'ar as it has an intrinsic unity and harmony. 
1. Ibid., p. 40. 
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By a negative route we are now able to state the 
distinction which Dewey would like to make. "Antt expe-
rience is a £usion o£ di££erent phases in a developing 
experiential process in the kind o£ unity which accen-
tuates these diverse phases. Such an experience. is 
possessed o£ value £or li£e. No one adjective may de£ine 
"an" experience, whether it be 'emotion, t 'intellect, r 
or 'practical concerns. 1 However, upon subsequent re-
£lective analysis we are o£ten able to £ind certain domi-
nant characteristics. 
Furthermore, "an" experience has a peculiar and 
idios~cratic 1£elt quality, 1 or emotional satis£action 
concomitant with its consummation. As an example we 
might point to those times in our own lives when we have 
exclaimed, "that was a real experiencel" When we contrast 
.such an event to the ordinary hum-drum a££airs o£ daily 
li£e, we £ind a suggestion o£ the di££erentiating £actors. 
The most fundamental contrast seems to lie in the 
presence, in ~ experience, o£ a unique kind of value 
or a special signi£icance £or our lives. We might point 
to many instances in our lives when experience seemed 
particularly valuable and meaning£ul, when the whole tex-
ture o£ our lives was pervaded with a quality o£ unity 
or narmony, impossible to disregard. So strong is the 
£usion o£ all the aspects o£ our lives at such times 
that we are most keenly aware not only o£ satis£action 
attained, but of our very pulsating existences. Such experiences 
I 
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might well be dominated by any emotional tone or quality, 
such as fear, sorrow, or joy. The particular events or 
phases of experience prior to the consummating and unify-
ing aspect might have radically diverse characters, such 
as rests, pauses, periods of intense emotion, etc., but. 
the quality of wholeness or fusion of these different 
aspects is the central factor, along with the felt sense 
of satisfaction and significance. 
On the other hand, in the ordinary ongoings of life 
there is generally a lack of concern with connection, or-
ganization, and aim or goal. There is no dominating in-
terest controlling our attention, and there is a kind of 
passivity in our reactions to our surroundings or environ-
ment. We normally yield to external pressures, or, per-
haps, we evade life by our very behavioro There might 
even be starts and stops, but if we reflect upon the or-
dinary course of our lives, we cannot deny the hum-drum 
quality of existence, the lack of significance and ab-
sorption which pervades "an" experience. 
Turning to the more difficult question of the criteria 
for distinguishing between "any" experience and "an" expe-
rience, we must keep in mind that Dewey does not intend 
a radical bifurcation of experience ~y this differentiation. 
Deweyts radical empiricism is apparent in this context, 
in so far as he would ask each of us to introspect and 
ask if such a distinction is not obvious to the facts of 
• II 
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our own experience. The first criterion is that of sig-
nificance, of meaning or value. In so far as our on-
going experience reveals movements of unique value or 
significance, then to this degree we have an empirical 
standard in terms of which we are able to make the re-
quired distinction. Furthermore, in so far as these 
significant experiences run through the warp and woof 
of experience in general, or punctuate our lives, we 
have another standard of judgment. "An" experience is 
simply the intensification, clarification, and develop-
ment of those traits that belong to every normally com-
plete experience: Intensification, in terms of emo-
tional tone and consummation; clarification, in terms 
of increased organization and coherence. 
Thus, as further criteria we might suggest coherence, 
or internal organization and continuity through the move-
ment of experience. "An" experience gathers up its 
different phases, gives them added significance, and is 
itself, in its completion, the richer for their inclusion. 
Because "antt experience seems to add enrichment to the 
texture of everyday life, and value·to the different phases 
of experience, Dewey finds it necessary somehow to set it 
apart from ordinary living. When an experience has the 
above qualities, i.e. emotional unity, significance, in-
creased coherence and continuity, it has aesthetic charac-
ter, even though it may not be a dominantly aesthetic expe-
rience. 
-• 
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2. Experience as Subject-Matter 
As we make the necessary distinctions between ordin_ary 
experiencing and aesthetic experience, it will be relevant 
to consider several important factors; first, ·What 1 reality,' 
'truth,' 'perception,' and 'intelligence' are for Dewey; 
secondly, the relation between substance and form in aes-
thetic experience; thirdly, the manner in which intellect, 
emotion, and volition relate-internally in the experiential 
process; and, finally, what it means to be a 'live creature, ,l 
living aesthetically and creatively so that experience be-
comes, qualitatively, an art. 
i. Definitions 
It has already been indicated that Dewey is aware of 
the importance of history, or the moving processes of life 
and thought, and of the empirical method of inquiry. For 
him, reality may no longer be conceived as fixed, ultimate, 
absolute or certain; rather, it becomes the very process of 
dialectical growth and development, and is to be discerned 
within the natural order of experiential transactions, not 
in some transcendental realm of 'pure reason' or as some 
hypothetical unknown.2 Reason is replaced by Dewey's rich 
concept of intelligence, and truth is seen to be that which 
1. ~., pp. 3-19. 
2. See Dewey's The Quest For Certainty (New York:' Minton, 
Balch & Go., l929)~ eassim. Hereinafter this book will 
be referred to as ~qtF · • · 
-
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is meaningful for experience. Having an experience is 
prior in time and importance to our knowledge of its con-
stituent elements and its further implications for life; 
and, ultimately, there can be no substitute for intelli-
gent experience in its fullness of richly qualitative con-
summation. "What is really 'in' experience extends much 
. 1 
further than that which at any time is known .. " 
In the discussion which follows there will be frequent 
reference to Dewey's Art As ExEerience, since this culmina-
ting work seems to state the philosopher's conception of 
experience more thoroughly, forcefully and convincingly 
than his other major works. Moreover, Art As Experience 
attempts to clarify some of the more obscure notions which 
arise elsewhere in Dewey's writings, and to explicitly de-
fine certain ideas which are vague and misleading in some 
of his less mature books. 
ii. Meaning and Works of Art 
In ordinary processes of experiencing, the distinction 
between substance or matter and form or essence cannot be 
made. Things contain both, whether these things be expe-
riences or works of art. However, neither nature nor man 
can be understood apart from their actual and mutual trans-
actions. Neither is meaningful or conceivable when divorced 
from the other; the relationship is one of dependency. Thus, 
the work of art is an initial product of artist and materials 
1. Dewey, EAN, p. 20. 
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in creatively qualified experiential interaction, while the 
object itself remains meaningless until perceived or re-
creatively enjoyed by man in aesthetically qualified expe-
rience. 
Potentially, a work of art is a strong influential-
factor in man's existence. However, things have truth and 
meaning for Dewey existentially. 
Sometimes the use of the word tttruthtt is con-
fined to designating a logical property of 
propositions, but if we extend its signifi-
cance to designate character of existential 
reference, this is the meaning of truth: pro-
cesses of change so directed that they achieve 
an intended consummation. •· • 1 The means is fully a means only ~ its end. 
The end, of course, is enriched experience. That which is 
most meaningful becomes an ideal for guiding our lives more 
dynamically and fruitfully, and these ideals are ~ 18 ex-
perience. They are those moments when the ebb and flow of 
a life's history are interrupted by experiences of consumma-
tion and fUlfillment, when satisfying and enriching equili-
brium is attained. 
In determining the actual meaning of 'ideal' and 'value' 
we must turn back to Dewey's criticisms of traditional think-
ing, for "it is natural to men to take that which is of chief 
value to them at the time as~ real."2 Further tthuman expe-
rience has also the pathetic longing for truth, beauty and 
·order, u3 but in taking longihgs and desires to be ideal values 
1. ~., p. 161. 
3. Ibid., p. 59. 
2. Ibid., p. 25. 
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and treating these, out o~ context o~ experiencing, as ~ 
absolute, eternal truths; as ultimate realities, we exhibit 
the ~allacy o~ selectivity, or a bias towards a particular 
thing which we then extend beyond 'the scope o~ the original 
situation, giving it a superiority over other experiences 
and objects. This Dewey calls "the ~allacy o~ selective em-
phasis."1 The word 'value' becomes a noun (rather than an 
adjective), synonymous with the 1 dei~ied' object which is now 
conceived to be Real Being. "Permanence, real essence, total-
ity, order, unity, rationality, the ~' verum ~ bonum o~ 
the classic tradition, are eulogistic predicates,n2 and nwhen 
we ~ind such terms used to describe the ~oundations and proper 
conclusions o~ a philosophic system, there is ground ~or sus-
pecting that an arti~icial simplification o~ existence has been 
per~ormed.u3 
Values and ideals, then, when treated merely as properties 
o~ things or persons, independent o~ their being valued, or re-
moved ~rom the experiential context, are separated ~rom the 
human element, and the dichotomy between subject and object is 
renewed. This is Dewey1 s principal objection, ~or i~ value is 
~ an object, how are we to explain the relation between the 
human element and the object desired, valued, or idealized? 
Empirically, however, "something previously indif~erent takes 
1. Ibid., pp. 27-29. 
Ibid., p. 28. We will see later on in this paper, how Dew~y cormp.its this same .fallacy with respect to the 'quali-tat~ve un~tyt o~ aesthetic experience. 
Ibid. It must be noted that Dewey does not object to the· 
operation o~ choice or selectivity, but only to its being 
concealed during the :process o~ investigation. -
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on the quality of value when it is actively cared for in a 
way that protects or contributes to its continued existence.n1 
While this method does render values more natural to expe-
rience, it also fosters the notion of man as responsible for 
his way of existence; rather, it sees to it that man protects 
his values and ideals by practicing them instead of assigning to 
them a kind of 'mystical' status of transcendence. Dewey con-
ceives such abstract ideals and values somehow as a weakness 
in man, indicative of his inability to live and cope with 
dangers or troubles existentially. Thus, man adores the im-
mutable and keeps his own precious life enclosed in a pro-
tective shell of remoteness from Real Being. In so doing, 
however, man sacrifices the richness and vitality of life 
that is available to him if he would only make the effort 
to intelligently control his destiny. The same principle 
holds true of the deification of Absolute Experience. 
There is more than the longing: there are moments 
of achievement. Experience exhibits ability to 
possess harmonious objects. It evinces an ability, 
within limits, to safeguard the excellent objects 
and to deflect and reduce the obnoxious ones. The 
concept of an absolute experience which is only 
and always perfect and good, first explicates these 
desirable implications of things of actual expe-
rience, and then asserts that they alone are real. 
The experienced occurrences which give poignancy 
and pertinency to the longing for a better world, 
the experimental endeavors and plans which make 
possible actual betterments within the objects of 
actual experience, are thus swept out of real Being 
into a limbo of appearances.2 · 
1. John Dewey, "Some Questions about Value, rt Value: A 
Cooperative Inquiry, ed. Ray Lepley (New York: Co'!um-
bia University Press, 1949), p. 8. 
2. Dewey, EAN, pp. 59-60. 
• 
28 
Significant experiences as the subject-matter for re-
flection have, for Dewey, discernible beginnings and endings, 
and the more pervaded by aesthetic qualities of integrity 
and fulfillment, the more intensely prized, valued, and 
sought for in future living. Such contexts, events, or 
histories are integrated units of experience even though 
they are vitally connected to both the past and the future. 
If we wish to know the literal meanings of terms we must for-
ever seek in vain for labels that might be universally ap-
plicable, for each context reveals its own peculiar elements 
and qualities to reflective inquiry, and none else. 
Thus, ideals are experiential, having intrinsic value 
for man who is strongly affected by such experiences, seeking 
thereafter for repetitions on the basis of remembered feelings 
of harmony, for further enrichment of life. Man is no less in-
tegral to such experiences and ideals are thereby 'had' in 
the actual process of living. What distinguishes these vivid, 
memorable experiences from ordinary experiencing is their 
characteristic qualities, the aesthetic richness of meaning. 
As Dewey says: "Experience exhibits ability to possess har-
monious objects. A purely stable world permits of no illu-
sions, but neither is it clothed with ideals.nl 
Experience is richer, more inclusive than pure rational 
thought and, again; thinking itself cannot give us real meaning, 
for to properly mean something there must be intensity of life 
l. Ibid., pp. 59-60. 
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and development of valuable experiences. To have meaning 
life must be concretely lived. "While the precarious nature 
of existence is indeed the source of all trouble, it is also 
an indispensable condition of ideality, becoming a sufficient 
condition when conjoined with the regular and assured."1 There 
is a need for order and regularity, but these too must be 'had' 
through effort and response in life situations. 
As for the relationship between meaning and truth, and 
Dewey's preference for the former term, he states: 
Meaning is wider in scope as well as more precious 
in value than is truth, and philosophy is occupied 
with meaning •.•• meaning is the wider category; 
truths are but one class of meanings, namely, those 
in which'a claim to verifiability by their con~e­
quences is an intrinsic part of their meaning. 
Experience at its most meaningful is consummatory; rather, 
in what Dewey speaks of as the struggle and tension of the pro-
-blematical situation, intelligence operates throughout, so 
that the situation comes to a successful, harmonious conclu-
sion. All such experiences are "art in germ,n but the impor-
tance of form, or embodiment in an objective work of art is 
to be noted. 
Apart from processes of art there lii7 no 
basis for introducing the idea of fulfill-
ment, realization, into the notion of end 
nor for interpreting antecedent operations 
as potentialities.3 
Art, like no other mode of human endeavor, presents the pic-
ture of a fulfilled experience in a kind of suspended, sus-
1. Ibid., p. 63. 
2. Dewey, Philosophy and Civilizationp pp. 4-5. 
3. Dewey, EAN, p. 125. 
• 
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taining embodiment so that men may observe and reflect on 
it; moreover, it is the highest mode of communication for 
this kind of experience. 
The work of art is, in the last analysis, the 
best mode of communication • • • the work of 
art is able to convey meaning in a way that is 
best understood by man, viz., in terms of the 
very qualities and objects which are constant 
factors in his experience.l 
In this sense form gives meaning direct embodiment. As 
such, the art prod~ct not only represents the terminus or con-
summation of a particular experience, but it is the best 
means for others to gain some insight into the real meaning 
of existence. Thus, it is an important means (as well as 
being an end in itself) of furthering genuine aesthetic ex-
periences. Unobserved, unperceived art works are meaningless. 
Art embodies the working through of a real, concrete situation, 
and is thus revelatory for mankind. It exhibits within itself 
the fulfilled utilization of means and the realization of life's 
potentialities. As formal embodiment, it is actual. As instru-
mental for other human lives, it is potential until recrea-
tively experienced by them. 11The work of art is formed matter.u2 
iii. Intellect, Volition, and Emotion 
In all experiencing, man and_nature -or the 'live creature' 
and his environment- are constantly interacting. Man 'does' 
and he 'undergoes'·· His status in the world is relational, and 
1. Jack Kaminsky, 11Dewey's Concept of An Experience," Phil • 
and Phenomenological Research, XVII, No.3 (March, !957), 
316-330. 
2. Dewey, !!!, pp. 106-133. 
~ 
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he is a being capable (as is nature) of widening his boundar-
ies and developing an enormous amount of potential within 
himself, both within the natural environment, as a participant 
in experiential undergoings, and in the world, as it is in-
ternally related to his doings. When Dewey speaks of man 
and nature as having 'no boundaries, ' he means that present 
environmental conditions are always relevant to experiencing, 
and that nature too is meaningless without the imprint of 
man's life upon and in it. Meaning is derived from expe-
ri·ence for both. Here too, Dewey wishes to dissolve the 
distinctions between 'subject' and 'object,t in experience 
which is synthetically conceived. 
1Any' experience exhibits the ordinary charqcteristics 
of the flow between man and his environment, but 'an' expe-
rience contains a greater degree of integrity. It has a 
unity of consummation and a quality which marks it as more 
vital and significant for life already lived and for future 
growth and development. The pattern of all experiencing is 
the same, but a real experience contains its own distinguish-
able (in reflective analysis), appropriate, and satisfying 
conclusion. It becomes not only an end, intrinsically valu-
able in its own right, but a real instrument or means for 
others to attain vision or insight when it is embodied in a 
work of art. 'An' experience is an attainment of harmony 
and unity in life, without the ordinary distractions, un-
balances, and frustrations which inhibit 'anyt experience 
from achieving such a_satisfying state of existence. 1An 1 
experience has quqlity designated 'aesthetic, t and when it 
• 
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is formally embodied in an art object, it communicates this 
consummatory experience and hence, such objects represent 
the highest degrees of potentiality and are the most impor-
tant means for sharing meaningful experiences. 
Every experience is potentially aesthetic in quality, 
for, as Dewey says: The aesthetic "is the clarified and in-
tensified development of traits that belong to every nor-
mally complete experience.nl And further, 
any consummatory experience contains that 
satisfaction which is liked for its ow.n 
sake • • • the knowledge that means and 
ends were united into a whole yields a 
sense of fulfillment that is aesthetic in 
nature.2 
The importance of a real experience embodied in a work 
of art, its value as an agent of communication, cannot be 
overestimated: 
Of all affairs, communication is the most 
wonderful. • • • When communication occurs 
all natural events are subject to recon-
sideration and revision; they are re-adapted 
to meet the requirements of the conversation, 
whether it be public discourse or that pre-
liminary discourse termed thinking. Events 
turn into objects, things with a meaning.3 
'An' experience is fulfillment and initiation. When 
we reflect and make distinctions for thought we must realize 
that this is an artificial process and not valid as experien-
tial categories. 
1. Ibid., p. 46. 
2 • Kaminsky, nnewey's Concept of An Experience,n p. 321. 
Dewey, EAN, p. 166. Dewey tends to use the· terms na.f.fair, tt 
"event,tf'ti'history," "situation," ttinteraction,tt "trans-
action," etc. synonymously. 
They are modes of understanding and some-
times of manipulating objects; means of 
identifying certain strands for the pur-
pose of practical control.l 
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There is really no meaning in life, for Dewey, without 
growth, and real development is imaginative as well as in-
telligent. It involves creativity in response. Before dis-
cussing .this aspect of his thought, it might be well to des-
cribe the factors in experience, namely, intellect, will, and 
emotion. These are not actually discerned in the actual pro-
cess of experience, although they may subsequently be ab-
stracted for thought. 
Strain, tension, or unbalance cause the organism to 
seek a re-establishment, a reunion, harmony and equilibrium 
with its environment. The experience itself, when we think 
about it, has a beginning which is primarily emotional, though 
not ultimately so, for this initial distinction between aspects 
of experiencing is inadequate to the facts. Further, there is 
a so-called mediate stage, in which the intellect is of primary 
importance for focussing the problem and reflecting upon it; 
and, finally, there is a final stage, characterized as the 
volitional, where the organism acts with determination, using 
all of its faculties in active pursuit of a desired terminus 
to the experience. As vital as they are, consummated expe-
riences are not easily had: 
These moments of consummation therefore, are 
the elements that give meaning and significance 
to life. But consummation • • • is difficult 
to obtain •• ·~~Without Lrreedom of inquiry 
• and imaginatioB; men lose a primary means 
1. Edman, "Dewey and Art, n p. 51. 
• 
for enjoying the kind of experience yhat 
they often spend a lifetime seeking. 
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Because art works embody fulfilled potentialities of expe-
rience in a form which is communicable, they are vital for 
life. Of course, those who wish to enjoy aesthetic expe-
riences must make the necessary effort in a process of re-
creation for the desired end of appreciation, understanding 
and value. 
In the actual process of having an experience, the 
organism is initially stirred by emotional feelings of un-
rest, tension, doubt and other similar disturbances, and has 
a desire to restore its equilibrium or balance. "Living • • • 
consists in a series of adjustments,n2 but it must be re-
membered that each new experience of adjustment is growth 
for the organism, to be used in subsequent responses to things. 
Experience is additive and expanding, and especially those ex-
periences which have had true meaning for us become signifi-
cant for our personalities. In this way each achievement of 
equilibrium differs from the one previously had in experience. 
Such occurrences in experience are not simply 
a series of sensations. They are sensations 
organized in a specific way and designed to 
fulfill some specific purpose. • • • All in-
quiry depends on the recognition of some pro-
blem and the construction of experience to re-· 
solve it.3 
In the process, the intellect is an important agent for 
selection of an appropriate course of action. Emotion is more 
1. Kaminsky, "Dewey's Concept of An Experience," p. 318. 
2. Ibid., P• 317. 3. Ibid., p. 318. 
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intimately related to the experience in terms of its flexi-
bility and continuing ability to change in order to meet 
the conditions of a developing situation. Individuals who 
are unable to adjust emotionally to changing circumstances 
are not totally normal, and it might be suggested that those 
who become psychotics are people who are in perpetual dis-
harmony or unbalance with their environments, being unable 
to develop intellectually, emotionally and volitionally to 
the rhythm of the changing status of their experience. Every 
normal being is capable of enjoying rich experiences, to 
varying degrees of intensity, and the more adept one becomes. 
at facing and conquering the conditions causing disunion and 
disharmony, the more thoroughly integrated does the complexity 
of his personality become. 
Only in the actual process of experiencing can we say 
that the "unity between the various modes of response; the 
emotional, volitional, and intellectual, is achieved."l In 
this primary experience there is no reflective examination 
taking place, but it p~ssesses intrinsic value when man is 
subsequently able to consciously examine "the very inter-
change ~ich has taken placi7 between himself and his environ-
ment.n2 
Unlike the lower animals he will not react 
mechanically to the rhythms discoverable in 
nature, but instead he will be able to ab-
stract from their concrete instances the pro-
1. John Dewey, "The Supremacy of Method," Classic American 
Philosophers, ed. M.H. Fisch (New York: Appleton-Century-
Crofts, Inc., 1951), p. 346. 
2. Kaminsky, "Dewey's Concept of An Experience," p. 317. 
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cesses of give and take !doing and undergoini7 
that occur between himse!f and his environment. 1 
There seem to be some indissoluble obscurities surrounding 
Dewey's notion of "unity" which will be discussed at a later 
point in this paper. For the moment, we will stay rather 
close to certain quotations which give some indication of 
what Dewey conceives·to be a unified experience. 
An experience has a unity that gives it its 
name • • • the existence of this unity is con-
stituted by a single quality that pervades the 
entire experience in spite of the variation pf 
its constituent parts. This unity is neither 
emotional, practical, nor intellectual, for 
these terms name distinctions that reflection 
can make within it. In discourse about an expe-
rience, we must make use of these adjectives of 
interpretation. In going·over an experience in 
mind after its occurrence, we may find that one 
property rather than another was sufficiently 
dominant so that it characterizes the· experience 
as a whole.2 
One might criticize Dewey for reducing thought to such 
a low, secondary status, but this would not be entirely fair, 
for throughout the entire process of experience, intelligent 
selection guides us towards meaningful consummations. We 
learn only in and through our experiences, as they are had 
and, subsequently, when we reflect upon their significance. 
With respect to works of art, Dewey feels that it is imp9s-
sible to know an art object simply by thinking about it, for 
it possesses its full meaning intrinsically, within an expe-
riential context. Aesthetic experience represents the prime 
example for all experiencing that has potential richness • 
Direct experience of an art object is a primary means for 
1. Ibid. 2. Dewey, AAE, p. 37. 
-
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educating ourselves and discovering what true value means 
for our existences. 
Another passage which might help to clarify what Dewey 
means by the unity of "an" experience in contrast to ordinary 
experiences which do not run their natural course to fulfill-
ment because of distractions or an inner lethargy, is the 
following: 
We have an experience when the material expe-
rienced runs its course to fulfillment. Then 
and then only is it integrated within and de-
marcated in the general stream of experience 
from other experiences. A piece of work is 
finished in a way that· is satisfactory; a pro-
blem receives its solution; a game is played 
through; a situation, whether that of eating 
a meal, playing a game of chess, carrying on 
a conversation, writing a book, or taking part 
in a political campaign, is so rounded out that 
its close is a consummation and not a cessation. 
Such an experience is a whole and carries with 
it its own individualizing quality and self-
sufficiency. It is an experience.l 
Within a particular frame of reference or a specified 
context, emotion, intellect, and volition are seen to be 
necessary stages towards the successful-completion of an 
experience. If these are not distinguishable as separate 
modes of response while we are experiencing, this adds to 
the integrity and strength of the experience. They are in-
ternally related during the:7process of experience, and all 
three must be sustained, as they in turn sustain, direct, 
and control the duration of the experience. :for the f'inal 
achievement to represent a really meaningful, vivid, and 
important synthesis. 
1. Ibid., P• 35. 
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Anxious to avoid the separation of the aesthetic from 
life, Dewey emphasizes the illigitimate use of the word 'emo-
tion, T and attempts to clarify its proper place within the 
natural flow of events for thought. 
It is sometimes said that art is the expression 
of the emotions; with the implication that, be-
cause of this fact, subject-matter is of no sig-
nificance except as material through which emo-
tion is expressed. Hence art becomes unique • 
• • • But by this definition, subject-matter is 
stripped of all its ow.n inherent characters in 
art in the degree in which it is genuine art; 
since a truly artistic work is manifest in the 
reduction of subject-matter to a mere medium of 
expression of emotion.l , 
Art works are not merely vehicles for the main purpose 
of transmitting emotions, and we are not justified in dis-
tinguishing between natural emotions and a unique kind of 
'aesthetic emotion.' 
For emotion in its ordinary sense is something 
called out £l objects, physical and personal; 
it is response ~ an objective situation. It 
is not something existing somewhere by itself 
which then employs material through which to ex-
press itself. Emotion is an indication of inti-
mate participation, in a more or less excited 
way in some scene of nature or life; it is, so 
to speak, an attitude or disposition which is a 
function of objective things.2 
The particular skill of the artist and the existence of an 
embodied experience in an objective work of art illustrates 
the culmination of .e.£ experience which was had in life •. 
When we seek the origin of works of art we find it in life. 
It still remains true that the origin of the art-
process lay in emotional responses spontaneously 
called out by a situation occurring without any 
1. Dewey, EAN, p. 390. 2. Ibid .. 
• 
• 
reference to art, and without "esthetic" quality 
save in the sense in which all immediate enjoy-
ment and suffering is esthetic.l 
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Part of the reason why art objects are able to tell us so 
much is the fact that the training of the artist permits him 
to employ economy in use of the materials so as to evoke the 
maximum emotional response. His own emotional reactions are 
thereby fused, concentrated to a high degree, which, in\turn, 
enables the intelligent and sensitive appreciator to re-expe-
rience an extraordinary response to an experience which ori-
ginated in that life which he himself shares with all men.' 
For any experience potentially rich "the emotional is 
its immediate quality. When·we are confronted with the pre-
carious, an ebb and flow of emotion marks a disturbance of 
the even tenor of existence.n2 This immediate sense of dis-
quietude is much like what Peirce calls "feelings of doubt" 
which disturb the individual-until he seeks a solution to the 
situation. James too speaks of this kind of process as one 
where thought settles doubt by coming to a believable idea 
which one then maintains is true. 
Emotion, for Dewey, pervades life, and he is not content 
to rest with a limited definition of it; rather, in Art As 
Experience he enters into an extensive discussion of its 
significance. Opposed to those who designate emotions as 
purely subjective states of feeling, he points out that our 
experiences are never disparate, or that a distinctive part 
1·. Ibid., p. 391 2. Dewey, "The_ Supremacy of Method," p.346. 
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may be called 'emotional' and another called 'objective.' 
The whole experience may be considered, on reflection, as 
emotionally charged or toned to varying degrees, but ttthere 
are no separate things called emotions in it •••• In the 
mature individual, emotional states, when they have any sig-
nificance at all, are attached to the moulding and construc-
tion of objective affairs.nl The intellectual and volitional 
aspects are not "separate thingsn-in experience; rather, they 
too are intimately related within a context and must refer, 
or have objective reference, to that experience as it is 
lived. 
One may compare Dewey to Benedetto Croce with respect to 
his emphasis on emotions as necessarily expressed, and not 
simply discharged without control. Going beyond Croce, Dewey 
stresses the need for ~ experience to take on significant or 
meaningful formal embodiment. This is not distinctively an 
aesthetic characteristic either, for ttforms are characters in 
virtue of which anything meets the requirements of an enjoyable 
perception."2 Forms-are truly significant when int~lligent, 
conscious selection, "for the sake of emphasis • • • give consumma-
tory significance to every-day subject-matters of experience.n3 
Thus, ordinary experiencing may be emotional, but ~ expe-
rience contains emotion that is "incorporated into definite 
1. Dewey, AAE, pp. 42ff. 2. Dewey, ~' p. 391. 
3. Ibid. Elsewhere Dewey states: "Without external embodi-
ment, an experience remains incomplete." See AAE, p. 51. 
plans and procedur~s • • •. Lfil becomes the quality that 
guides the selection of material, of the right word and 
phrase.n1 When they are meaningful, emotions are not 
ephemeral, nor do they arise unstimulated by anything out-
side of the self's experience. They are part of the com-
pound synthesis that represents active, purposeful living. 
Further, emotion is what gives experience its unique 
aesthetic quality, for it pervades and colors the whole pro-
cess from beginning to end, and is never absent. It is sus-
tained by the other modes of response while it sustains the 
balance and harmony of the whole. The experience contains 
the diverse factors of intellectual selectivity and voli-
tional intention, but it is the emotional aspect which alters 
and dyes the whole with a special quality which is the charac-
teristic of final achievement. Dewey does not speak of emo-
tions as discrete or spontaneous outbursts of feelings, but 
rather as it is able, due to man's conscious intentions, to 
be channelled "intelligently, when it is spent directly in 
search for material and in giving it order, not when it is 
directly expended."f Emotions must be harne.ssed to the major 
purpose of living artfully and creatively in growth and ex-
pansion. It is a controlling factor, but it too must be con-
trolled. It must be flexible so that it may adjust to, and 
help change the qualitative wholeness of the process as it 
1. Kaminsky, nDeweY,'s Concept of An Experience," pp. 320-321. 
2. Dewey, ~' p. 70. 
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works its~lf out, whether this be in active experiencing, in 
the creation of a work of art, or in the re-creative response 
to environmental conditions and to works of art. "In fact 
emotions are qualities, when they are significant, of a com-
plex experience [f.ifi] that moves and changes."1 
Emotions pervade all of experience, and are of vital 
importance in so far as they are able to "move and cement 
the experience" as a whole. 
While ordinary experience is emotional, the emotions, 
as primary factors of experience,are best seen and under-
stood in terms of aesthetic creation and response, for it 
is true that they are given embodiment in a formal work of 
art. Thus, we are better able to see emotion in a sustained, 
poised, finished object where the whole process may be reflec-
ted upon while the quality of the consummated experience is 
held still for our re-creative response. Ordinary experience 
has emotional qualities, but ~ experience has that particular 
quality of emotion which is controlled, directive and purpose-
ful for the whole of the experience. 
~motioriJ selects what is congruous and dyes 
what is selected with its color, thereby 
giving qualitative unity to material exter-
nally disparate and dissimilar. It thus pro-
vides unity in and through the various parts 
of an experience.2 
Similar, at this point, to the aesthetic theories· of 
Nietzsche, Freud, and Parker, Dewey believes that our npersonal 
feelings are enmeshed in the state of affairs that are observed 
1. Ibid., P• 41. 2. Ibid., p. 42. 
• 
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and the enrichment of life begins when personal emotive dis-
charges are channelized into the molding of an experience.n1 
Intelligent selection of means or materials Lfn artistic 
creatiori7with the concommitant active working them through 
to their proper concl~sions in the actual process of conscious 
experience, is that kind of situation or context that might 
well become a coherent whole, aesthetically satisfying and re-
warding in its own right. The more aware the individual is 
of what he does, why he thinks in certain ways, and how his 
emotions may profitably guide him, the more integrated does 
his personality and his life become. Nothing is known in ad-
vance of experience, and especially in artistic creation the 
end is not apparent until it is completely worked out, expressed, 
and embodied in a form. In this manner changes may occur all 
along the way to the greater benefit of the whole. 
It is not only the simple, immediate awareness of ten-
sion, or the disturbance of a problematic situation that is 
emotionally charged. Rather, it is a more complex mode of re-
sponse which endures throughout the total process of having ~ 
experience. While experiencing, one is never totally conscious 
of pure emotion, will, or intellect operating within the con-
text. One can never say that the feeling of disharmony is 
altogether due to emotional strains or stresses; however, dis-
cord is what induces reflection. 
1. Kaminsky, "Dewey's Concept of An Experience," p. 321. 
Cf. the following, similar quotation from Dewey, with 
Freud's aesthetic concept. "Then there is the indivi-
dual that finds a gap between its distinctive bias and 
• 
• 
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The intellect best serves and characterizes the mediate 
state between Limpur~ £eeling and Lfmpuri7 act. Conceptual-
izing and theorizing can never take the place o£'active parti-
cipation, or experience, and when Dewey speaks of these modes 
of response, he does so as though an experience had already 
been consummated. At that point, thought is responsible £or 
making the necessary distinctions, descriptions, and explana-
tions. Here one might mention Dewey's suggestive distinction 
between "recognition" and true "perception, 11 £or we will 
have cause to re£er to it again. 
We recognize all manner o£ things as, £or example, any-
thing we spontaneously label is (£or us) something we recog-
nize (e.g. we recognize a bottle as a 'bottle, t as distinct 
£rom anything that is not a bottle, say, a hair pin). True 
perception, on the other hand, involves real insight. To 
perceive is to be able to grasp the uniqueness, the 'parti-
cularity' o£ a thing or a work of art by 'taking it in' or 
responding to it as a whole. Only perception in this sense 
enables us to have true experiences: "Recognition usually 
occurs instantaneously ••• but, in no case can there 
be perception o£ an object except in a process developing 
in time.nl This point serves to illustrate Dewey's continuous 
the operations of the things through which alone its needs 
can be satisfied; it is broken off, discrete, because it 
is at odds with its surroundings. It either surrenders, 
conforms, and for the sake of peace becomes a parasitical 
subordinate, indulges in egotistical solitude; or its ac-
tivities set out to remake conditions in accord with desire. 
In the latter process intelligence is born.~' (EAN, p. 245.) 
1. Kaminsky, "Dewey's Concept of An Experience, 11 p. 327. 
• • 
• 
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emphasis on perception as an active process, one where energy 
is expended. This is essential £or real insight or £or any 
knowledge o£ meaning and value to be derived from experience. 
It is part of the re-creative, lived process of aesthetic ap-
preciation and response, but it is not the intention o£ this 
chapter to dwell on this facet of Deweyts aesthetic theory. 
We re£er to it now only as a means o£ pointing out Dewey's 
emphasis on a life deeply and intensively lived, rather than 
one of merely responding in a superficial manner to the various 
aspects of the environment and to works of art. Recognition 
is part of any ordinary experiencing, but perception is a 
necessary aspect of ~ experience. This concept also relates 
the notions of creativity and aesthetic response, for they 
are but two sides of the same coin, or the creative and re-
creative aspects of Experience. 
Experience can be described as a process wherein stages 
may be distinguished and used to explain the occurrence, and 
we must do this if any sense is to be made of Deweyts philo-
sophy. Emotion best describes the immediacy and pervasive 
quality of the whole of an experience, while intellect best 
characterizes the mediate stage where a course o£ action is 
selected from among all the possibilities that are continually 
arising throughout the experience. Here the live creature must 
necessarily select those things which he knows and which have 
a stronger interest for him by virtue of their special rele-
vance to the concrete situation. Such choices are personal 
and condition the kind of re-union which the individual will 
• 
I 
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effect with his environment. There is an element of rela-
tivity in this notion of choice or selection of means, for 
backgrounds, education, interests, desires, etc., cannot be 
universal. 
The intellect is·identical with an indirect 
mode of response, because its function is to 
locate the·source of the problem and discover 
its nature; form an idea of how it may be 
dealt with, so that operations may be directed 
in view of an intended solution.l · 
Once again, in attempting to describe, Dewey must inhibit, 
or sterilize, his broad concept of experience, but this can 
hardly be avoided. 
The intellectual process may be hindered by overpowering 
emotions or disturbances which distract or mislead the inten-
tions of the creature. The volitional aspect is therefore al-
most immediately necessary in order that the intellect 1 s de-
cision may be carried through to its recognized completion 
successfully. The means employed are continuously receiving 
further clarification as the experience itself unfolds, and 
a successful resolution is not apprehended until the whole 
is complete; moreover, the direction, the way, or the means 
may both be intelligently selected and volitionally pursued, 
yet success remains contingent upon the emotion which must 
sustain, control, and permeate the whole. The will is not 
absent from the intellectual stage, or one would have no real 
impetus to discover the appropriate means as they appear. 
A· proper balance must be achieved and maintained between 
the three modes of response if one is not to overwhelm and 
subdue the others, thereby impinging upon the successful 
1. Dewey, "The Supremacy of Method,n p. 347. 
• 
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readjustment of man's experience. Many situations are so 
hindered that a man is badly deflected :from the course of 
his life so that he is unable to function in ordinary expe-
riencing. An individual may be unable to locate the real 
. 
source of his temporary unbalance, and thus crucially inhibit 
his energies and efforts :from directing him towards a comple-
tion of·the experience. Progress, once interrupted by dis-
traction or disturbance, is all the more difficult to achieve. 
However, if growth is to be made, successes are necessary and 
new adaptations within the environment must be made. 
To :further clarify the distinction for thought, the voli-
tional aspect may be described as the final or concluding stage 
o:f an experience. 
Under conditions of resistance and conflict 
aspects and elements of the self and the 
world that are implicated in this interaction 
qualify experience with emotio~s and ideas so 
that conscious intent emerges. 
Obviously, our volition will lack strength unless it is con-
stantly enforced by a :flexible and active emotion as well as 
by intelligent operations within the context of the experience. 
Volition or will, too, is not an isolated factor in experience. 
Experience, viewed as a synthesis of all three aspects, 
may be said to contain them all most satisfactorily in a moment 
o:f consummation. However, the singleness or uniqueness of an 
experience is not adequately des·cribed as a thing of the moment, 
but rather in terms of the enduring, sustained, collected and 
pervasive tone of the whole process which builds and reinforces 
1. Dewey, AAE, p. 35. 
• 
• 
itself as direction and outcome become more apparent. What 
makes ~ experience distinct is the quality of completion 
in restored harmony. 
Again, "when the past ceases to trouble and anticipations 
of the future are not perturbing • • • a being Lf£7 wholly 
united with his environment and therefore fully alive.n1 The 
present is never totally isolated from the past or the future, 
which are conditions for its existence; rather, in an instant 
they seem to be contained harmoniously in a significant present 
moment which is not only an ideal ~' but will be memorable 
in future living. 
The fact has already been stated that, for Dewey, such 
moments are not only consummations, but als? commencements 
for new, expanding and enriched experiences. The kind of 
stability that is attained "is not a marmoreal calm; it is an 
edged serenity, a heightened peace.n2 Because art forms "con-
serve the tensions resolved"3 as no other form of experience 
·can, such creativity is not only the best means for the com-
munication and sharing of ~ experience, but aesthetic expe-
rience becomes the prototype, the highest form of human 
achievement. 
3. The Significance of Art 
Although Dewey "wrote nothing directly or specifically 
on the subject of aesthetics • • • up to his seventieth year 
1. Ibid., p. 18. 2. Edman, "Dewey and Art, 11 p. 60 • 
3· Ibid. 
-
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• • • he had been alerted to the aesthetic implications of 
his leading ideas.rr1 Throughout Experience and Nature, for 
example, he was aware that any significant experience was 
"art in germ," and that art ttactually experienced in creation, 
or enjoyment was a paramount instance of ••• fulfillment.n 2 
Of the utmost concern for Dewey was that kind of experience 
which makes life valuable and worth living; that kind of con-
summatory event which brought,order, control, and dynamic 
finality into a person's life. As for Nietzsche, it represents 
a tryea saying,n a positive affirmation of life. With Art As 
Experience, we may glance at his earlier writings and find, 
whether implicit or explicit, Dewey taking aesthetic qualities 
for granted. Again, like Nietzsche, Dewey believes that aesthe-
tic experience contains values that transform life; however, 
it required the publication of Art As Experience 
to spell out for a good many readers the lesson 
that, far from neglecting or ignoring the claims 
of art, art was the illustration par excellence, 
for.Dewey, of the·ultimate meaning of intelligence, 
morals, democracy, education, and even ultimately 
of the nature of things.3 
Thoughtful, intelligent living that is emotionally toned and 
, 
contains the other necessary factors for ~ experience, is art-
ful, and a life cQnsistently so lived is itself a work of art. 
It would seem that, for Dewey, the real difference between 
'artistic' and 'aesthetic' (which we will discuss at greater 
length later on) is not necessarily an ultimate distinction 
between the experiences of creating and appreciating; rather, 
1. Edman, nnewey and Art," p. 47. 
3. ~., p. 48. 
2. Ibid. 
• 
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if ~ experience takes place these two factors are separate 
aspects of the total situation •. Dewey wants us to be aware 
that things are not identical, but neither are they disparate 
within experience. Ultimately he does not see a real differ-
ence between the creative and re-creative acts, and if we can 
discern a difference it is rather in degree than in kind. 
Further, both may be artistic and aesthetic in experiences 
that are rich and consummatory. What is significant in the 
production of a work of art is also meaningful in the aesthetic 
response to art objects. The advan~age which objects have over 
experience, in the ordinary sense, is that they are embodiments 
or permanent forms of real experiences, and have an eternal 
instrumental value. 
Experience is artful at any time, as potential, and art 
is what all experiencing contains in the form of possibilities. 
"A work of art, in any of the arts, is the expressive movement 
of matter to a formed fulfillment. In art the organization of 
energies becomes a matter of direct perception.nl A work of 
art also represents a fully integrated experience. "It is in-
evitable in its rightness ••• nothing in it can be altered 
without altering all, and • • • its occurrence is spontaneous, 
unexpected, fresh, unpredictable.n2 In other words, throughout 
the process of creating the end is not perceivable, but at the 
completion, when the object is before us as a whole, all the 
steps, as embodied, seem somehow to have been necessary to the 
1. ~., P• 49. 
2. Dewey, EAN, p. 359. 
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work. 
Human experience, historically viewed is, for Dewey, 
the story of the development of the arts. Thought, scienti-
fic method, real moments in history are all examples of 
.L 
aesthetic, artful experiences. 
There are ••• but two alternatives. Either 
art is a continuation, by means of intelli-
gent selection and arrangement, of natural tend-
encies of natural events; or art is a peculiar 
addition to nature springing from something 
dwelling exclusively within the breast of man, 
whatever name be given the latter.l 
Dewey goes on to explain why art is a "natural continuation," 
for what man does when he creates or responds re-creatively, 
is to expand both the natural world and his own personality. 
Art is intimately related and connected to the very process 
of daily living, and even emotion, which distinctively quali-
fies the aesthetic, is an Uindication of intimate participa-
tion, ••• in some scene of nature or life.u2 
The artist has an experience which includes all of the 
ordinary factors of experiencing, but to a·heightened and con-
centrated degree, which he then embodies, sustaining all the 
elements of the experience in a form that endures and gives 
witness to a real experience of growth and expansion. «Fine 
art, consciously undertaken as such is peculiarly instrumental 
in quality.n3 Thus, fine art has a practical, utilitarian 
function. It is not Dewey's intention to divorce the creation 
of art objects from the normal factors of experience, whether 
it be the practical, emotional, intellectual, volitional, or 
1. Ibid., p .• 389. 
3. ~., p. 392. 
2. Ibid., P• 390. 
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any other conceivable aspects of' experiencing. 
Finally, ffexperience in the form of art, when reflected 
upon • • • solves more problems which have troubled philosophers 
and resolves more hard and fast dualisms than any other theme 
of thought.tt1 Explicitly, then, art not only is a communicator 
of meaning and value, but the prototype of' experience in which 
we readily see dualisms dissolve and disappear.2 
In art, the active process, the energy of creative living 
is freely expended, and the experience is more intense because 
effort is localized; the situation is specific. The whole 
is a context rich and vibrant with meaning. Further, we must 
not forget the imaginative factor, which in art is very important. 
The artist's imagination has free reign within the context of 
a particular production, given the limitations imposed by the 
materials and other factors. In this way it is appropriately 
channelled to the immediate task, restrained and guided by the 
intellect, will, and emotion; yet, art does seem to "celebrate 
human life at its highest pitch of living intensity.u3 In this 
sense it manages to communicate richly by celebrating, .enhancing 
the qualities of ordinary human experience, making them somehow 
'extraordinary,' thereby heightening the very ebb and flow of 
natural events. 
As the manifestation of a fully realized, consummated expe-
rience, 11art provides a unique control for the imaginative 
1. Ibid. 
2. See Edman,. ttDewey and Art, n passim. 
3. Dewey, ~' pp. 272-274. 
,e 
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ventures of philosophy.nl Moreover, 
since art as experience shows best what expe-
rience is, an adequate empirical philosophy 
must look at what goes on in response to art, 
where our interactions with our environment 
are not broken up and dislocated.2 
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Experience lived at its highest moments is embodied in art 
objects, which in turn become the common properties of those 
who would perceive them. 
If we were to search for a term that might be more 
descriptive than the unqualified word 'experience, t we might 
say that the aim of human life, and of art, is experience in 
its integrity.3 This integrity is more striking in works of 
art, which objectify such experiences. "Art is intelligi-
bility become an immediate delight and a freedom enjoyed."4 
1. Ibid., P• 64. 
2. Ibid. 
J. Ibid.' p. 65. 
4. Ibid. 
• ,( ·. 
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CHAPTER III 
DEWEY1 S THEORY OF CRITICAL JUDGMENT 
Having discussed the nature of experience in general, 
and aesthetic experience in particular, as well as the com-
monalities of factors involved, we must now turn to an ex-
amination of Dewey's theory of critical judgment, both with 
regard to aesthetically qualified experiences and to the 
general subject of philosophical reconstruction.! 
1. Aesthetic Criticism 
For Dewey, just as aesthetic experience and art are 
"continuations, by means of intelligent selection and ar-
2 
rangement, of nat:ural tendencies of natural events, tr so 
too, the difference between aesthetic criticism and any 
other form of critical judgment is one of diverse emphases. 
However, the subject-matter "of aesthetic criticism is the 
perception of aesthetic objects."3 
Since, for Dewey, ffjudgment is appropriately termed 
criticism wherever the subject-matter ••• concerns goods 
1. See Dewey, RIP, passim. 
2. Dewey, EAN, p. 389. 
3. Dewey, AAE, p-. 298. 
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or values, n1 the term 'judgment' would seem to have a more , 
general connotative meaning. Hence, "an understanding of 
judgment is ••• the first condition for theory about the 
nature of criticism."2 
i. Judicial Judgment 
Since Dewey is primarily concerned with the fact of 
direct experiencing, he is opposed to those who would sub-
mit to judicial or authoritative judgments. With respect 
to the question of standards of•taste, this school of thought 
would delegate responsibility to certain seemingly competent 
officials; moreover, the expectation would be that these so-
called 'judges' would establish some sort of infallible· 
standard that would be universally applicable. Here again 
we have an example of what Dewey would call the simplicist 
fallacy of hasty over-generalization, or, in this case, the 
arbitrary selection of certain authorities whose judgments 
are then so extended as to exclude the possibility of univer-
sal experience and intelligent choice of standards. Taking on 
-
someone's tastes and· calling them one's own has the same arti-
ficiality and affectedness as the attempt to deceive oneself 
and others in any manner; for example, driving a friend's 
Cadillac and claiming that you are its owner. 
1. Joseph Ratner ( ed.) , Intelligence in the Modern World: 
John Dewey's Philosophy (New York: Random House, Inc., 
l939), p. 260 • 
2. Dewey, AAE, p. 298. 
• 
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Since ttperceptions supply judgment with its material,"1 
there can be no substitute £or actual, personal experience. 
"Perception is obstructed and cut short by memory of an in-
fluential rule, and by substitution of precedent and prestige 
for direct experience.n2 Judicial criticism cannot be con-
sidered an enriching, expanding mode of judgment, for it 
stifles and inhibits the proper end or purpose of critical 
judgment, which is renewed, further developed personal expe-
rience. 
A judgment is properly ttan act of controlled inquiry;"3 
moreover, when we reflect upon a significant experience, we 
actively engage in analytic and synthetic processes, and we 
are controlled, both by the object under investigation and 
by our personal frames of reference. 
Judicial criticism is the kind of judgmental claim of 
absolute certainty and finality, and Dewey is consistently 
opposed to systems which make such claims.4 In place of 
systematic thinking he has substituted methodology; infal-
lible reason and truth have become operative intelligence 
and meaning. In place of some transcendent, unknowable, and 
purely hypothetical reality, significant experience has be-
come that which exhibits ideals and makes life worth living. 
1. Ratner, OE· cit., p. 261. 
2. Dewey, AAE, p • 299. 
. -
3. Ratner, OE· cit., P• 263 • 
4-~t See especially, Dewey, QFC, passim. 
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For the judicial critic, "it is much easier to 'tell' 
people what they should believe than to discriminate and 
uni.fy.ul To rely on arbitrary, pre-determined, objective 
standards o.f taste, is to deny that which is most meaning-
ful for existence - that is, the values of growth, expan-
sion and development of a more fully integrated personal 
relationship with one's environment. 
The very meaning of an important new movement 
in any phase of life is that it expresses some-
thing new in human experience •••• The mani-
festations of the movement therefore cannot be judged but only misjudged unless the critic i~ 
sensitive first o.f all to "meaning and life.nZ 
The great harm incurred by an uncritical acceptance 
of judicial standards is that there can be no new modes of 
experiencing; furthermore, in the realm of art objects, any-
thing significantly removed from the prerequisites of those 
objectively selected and determined rules or standards for 
judgment, would necessarily have to be condemned, for there 
would be no existing principles to sanction such an emergence 
into the world. How could we ever adjust our tastes to the 
changing scene, meeting its needs as well as our own? 
This question concerning final, authoritative, objective 
regulations or standard rules, is intimately related to the 
problem of form and matter, and the relativity of particular 
experiential contexts. We will discuss this more fully further 
on in this chapter. 
4lt 1. Ratner, loc. cit. 
2. Ratner, op. cit., p. 264. 
• 
ii. Impressionist Judgment 
The blundering and ineptness of much that calls 
itself judicial criticism has called out a reac-
tion to the opposite extreme in the form of "im-
pressionist" criticism. It is • • • a denial · 
that criticism in the sense of judgment is possible.l 
The reaction against a form of criticism in which works of 
art are strictly governed by existing rules or objective 
standards, takes the position of subjectivism, or extreme 
relativism. Judgments- are to be regarded as perfectly valid 
in every case where an individual responds to a work of art, 
even if this be a purely emotional reaction or a direct, un-
reflective assertion of one 1 s immediate impression. 
Dewey is also opposed to this extreme form of criticism, 
because in place of a "standardized objectivity • • • the chaos 
of subjectivity that lacks objective control"2 is substituted. 
Both of these schools of thought regarding the question of 
judgment give inadequate accounts, according to Pewey, not only 
because they are prejudiced and incomplete in their investiga-
tions of the integrity of aesthetic experience, but also in the 
destructive consequences for experience. They tend to detract 
from meaningful, valuable experiences; the one, because it 
foists preconceived notions about taste upon the percipient 
which inhibit his original response; the other, because it al-
lows for uncontrolled reactions and the incorporation into the 
experience of superfluous, subjective elements. Rather than deal 
l. Ibid • 
2. Dewey, AAE, p. 304. 
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with values that are both instrumental and final, the judi-
cial and impressionist critics fight a senseless battle over 
the meaning of the word 'standard.' The question for them is 
whether standards are 'objective' or 'subjective,' and this 
is to bypass the central issue involved in critical judgment, 
or "the function •' • • [Of] • • • discrimination and unifica-
tion. nl 
The material from which judgment grows is the objective 
work of art, but it is this object as it is experienced by 
the critic, including his own peculiar sensitivities and ex-
tended background and store of knowledge. The subsequent 
judgment of the critic must carefully account for the consti-
tuent elements involved in the work of art,.his own response, 
and_the experience as a whole. He must discriminate between 
these factors and describe them, so that his judgment may 
evoke a clearer consciousness in others of the diverse as-
pects of the work of art, as experienced by him. Further, he 
must show the relationship among the parts, or how they fit 
together consistently and coherently to form a whole, inte-
grated experience. 
Unfortunately, what the judicial critic tends to do is 
limit his discussion to the object, omitting his personal in-
volvement and basing his criticism upon pre-established cri-
teria. He loses the experiential aspect of the synthetic ele-
ment. On the other hand, the impressionist forgets that he 
1. Ratner, op. cit., p. -267. 
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must not only be controlled by his own limitations, but also 
by the actual presence of an object which is other-than-him-
self. In this way he loses the experiential character of the 
total experience by denying equal validity to the real object 
of the synthetic experience. 
Neither of these solutions to the problem of standards of 
taste or critical judgment may be accepted, for both commit, 
in one way or another, the exclusionist fallacy of selective 
emphasis. Every aspect of experience is relevant, and we 
must not arbitrarily elect certain elements to be prior to 
others or exclusive of other affects. 
2. The Question of Means and Ends 
Aesthetic experiences, distinguished from ordinary expe-
riencing, "are .situations in which self-enclosed, discrete, 
individualized characters dominate •••• These qualities 
mark any experience in so far as its final character dominates.n1 
However, such experiences and their objectified embodiments 
in works of art are "also involved in a continuity of inter-
actions and changes, and_ hence are causes and means of later 
experiences.n2 
i. Art Objects as Final and Instrumental 
A work of art is not only an individualized, distinct 
embodiment of a single consummated experience, for it exhibits 
1. Dewey, QFC, p. 235 • 
2. JQ!£., p. 236. 
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~ the very process wherein means, substances, or materials were 
utilized intelligently and selectively. Here again, Dewey is 
anxious to emphasize the internal relatedness of form and con-
tent, means and ends, etc., within the context of full expe-
riences. Objects of art, as well as aesthetic response to 
them, cannot be viewed merely as particular means or specific 
formal ends, but only as total contexts or significant events 
occurring within a continuum of interactive experiencing. For 
example; 
theories which separate form and matter, theories 
that strive to find a special locus in experience 
for each, are, in spite of their oppositions to 
one another, cases of the same fundamental fallacy. 
They rest upon separation of the live creature from 
the environment in which it lives.l 
Particularly in aesthetic experience are we able to find 
the kind of context which is meaningful for life, but not un-
less we enter into the unity and integrity of the total situa-
tion. Just as the art object depends, for its beauty, on the 
total integration of means and ends, form and matter, so too 
the experience of response must not be sacrificed either to some 
further end or to some preconceived notion which inhibits the 
immediate realization of the situation at hand. 
In esthetic experience • • • the material of the 
past neither fills attention, as in recollection, 
nor is subordinated to a special purpose. There 
is, indeed, a restriction imposed upon what comes. 
:But it is that of contribution to the immediate 
matter of an experience now had. The material is 
not employed as a bridge to some further experience, 
'but as an increase and individualization of present 
experience.2 
1. Dewey, AAE, pp. 130-131. 2. Ibid, pp. 122-123. 
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We have already referred to the tjudicialt and tim-
pressionist' schools of thought regarding aesthetic criti-
cism. Perhaps it will benefit our discussion if we refer 
to Stephen Pepper's book The Basis of Criticism in the Arts, 
in which he speaks of Deweyts position, in distinction to 
others, as "contextualism.nl Pepper begins the chapter by 
quoting from an article by Otis Lee entitled "Value and the 
Situation:" 
The concept of situations enables us to under-
stand how values are objective, as common men 
believe them to·be, and at the same time con-
crete, specific, and inherent in the process 
of ••• experience.l 
Unlike the impressionist, who would identify 'value' with 
the emotive reaction of the individual subject, the contextualist 
finds values rooted in an experience of active participation be-
tween the percipient and the work of art before him. The mater-
ials which constitute a work of art belong to the common world 
of natural situations and things, and therefore, with Dewey, 
we can see a strong element of objective relativity. Works 
of art may be aesthetically experienced by anyone, in his 
own peculiar or unique manner of response. 
1. 
2. 
A new poem is created by every one who reads 
poetically - not that its ~ material is ori-
ginal, for, after all, we live in the same old 
world, but that every individual brings with 
him, when he exercises his individuality Las 
the judicial critic does notlJ, a way of seeing 
and feeling that in its interaction with old 
materials creates something new, so2ething pre-
viously not existing in experience • 
Stephen Pepper,. The Basis of Criticism in the Arts (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 55. 
Dewey, ~' p. 108. 
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We have already indicated that the aesthetic character 
of a situation is identified with the perception of quali-
tative aspects in experiences• However, as Pepper rightly 
points out: ttthe field .of humanly intuited qualities of 
events [fif too wide.. Even when narrowed to vividly in-
tuited quality, it includes toothaches and other involun-
tarily endured pains.n1 I't( is necessary that we limit the 
I 
aesthetic field to those qualitative experiences that are 
voluntarily sought for as satisfying in particular situa-
tions, and for their own sakes. Dewey would even say that 
for some people a t.oothache might well serve to stimulate 
an aesthetic response in a particular context, and that 
this element of quality must be considered relative to 
different people in diverse situations. 
Pepper continues by stating the contextualist's aesthe-
tic standard: "The more vivid the experience and the more 
extensive and rich its quality, the greater its aesthetic 
value.n2 Not value conceived as 'pleasure,' but the type 
of experience that can most intensively contribute to en-
riched living. "Intensity and depth of experience - that 
is the contextualistic standard of beauty.n3 
In a fundamental sense, the basic categories of the 
contextualistic hypothesis de_:fy explanation. "Quality, 1' 
1. Pepper, The Basis of Criticism in the Arts, p. 56. 
2. Ibid., p. 57 • 
3. ~· 
• 
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"fusion," and "unity" are terms which the contextualist 
employs to explain other thi'ngs. Ultimately, one can only 
read a poem, stand before a painting, or listen to a sym-
phony and sense ttthe character, the mood, and ••• the per-
sonality of an event ••• ffoi] that is what the contextu-
alist means by quality.n1 Though each situation or work 
of art, as experienced, is unique for each percipient, one 
can speak to others about the object itself, and perhaps 
agree, not only about/technique and other formal matters, 
but also with regard to the quality experienced. 
·If quality is what one exp.eriences as the "total charac-
ter, • • • this character is derived f.rom a fusion of the 
characters of the details interrelated»2 within the work of 
art or,the situation experienced./ Pepper gives an illumina-
ting description of how the contextualist speaks of the word 
"fusion," or how he might use it; 
It is like the separa~e notes of a chord which 
fuse in the specific character of the chord, 
which yet is made out of·the verx characters of 
the notes that compose it. LYe~ fusion is • • • 
pointed to as something ultimate, and unanalyzable, 
and immediate.3 
But even if it cannot be explained, we can say 
things about it. For, of course, fusion is not 
explained by pointing out that the quality of a 
fusion is made up of the qualities of the details 
fused. The whole point about a fusion is that it 
results in a quality different from the qualities 
of any of its constituents.4 
1. Ibid., P• 59 • 2. ~., p. 61. 
3. Ibid. 4. ~., p. 64. 
• 
This brief digression into Pepper's summary of the 
contextualist position, brings us to a point of greater 
clarity with respect to Dewey's aesthetic theory. Words 
such as "intuition" and "vividly fused experience" serve to 
emphasize our previous discussion of the emotional charac-
teristic of aesthetic experience, which "dominates and per-
vades the whole." ttWhen ..the .:fiu~ion is massive and unmis- · 
takably draws in the dynamic tensions of instinctive action, 
no one would hesitate to call it emotional."1 
Now, returning to the question of means and ends, we 
might more easily see why an aesthetic experience is an 
'end;' but even in subsequent analysis of the "felt or 
had fusion" we can discern the possibility for greater en-
richment of quality. The experience, as a means for analysis 
and understanding of the constituent elements of a work of 
art, is further enriched by this practical effort when we 
are once again confronted with the same object, or by the 
same situation. "The ways in which artists have learned 
to increase the vividness of quality • • • and to increase 
the spread of quality by the organization of details, are 
known as the artist's techniques.n2 Moreover, we too, as 
appreciators or percipients can increase our "techniquestt of 
response by education, experience, greater understanding, and 
increased effort of perception of works of art. "In general 
and over a number of perceptions, the realization of the work 
1. Ibid. 2. Ibid., pp. 65-66. 
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increases. nl · 
The judicial critic prevents the creative achievement 
o~ new values by consigning ready-made labels to works o~ 
art. The impres~ionistic critic believes that the ~ull 
meaning of a work of art can be grasped in the immediacy 
of response and that judgments can be made on the basis 
of pure, unre~lected feeling. But, though every experience 
exists at a ngiven moment ••• to infer from this fact that 
its import and validity are a~~airs o~ that passing moment 
is to reduce all experience to a shifting kaleidoscope of 
meaningless incidents.n2 
The contextualist critic, on the other hand, realizes 
the importance of the immediate experience as a n~elt whole," 
reflects and analyzes the actual elements involved, using 
the funded knowledge of past experiences, and is there~ore 
able to re-establish his relationships with art works and 
his environment with a greater synthesis of achieved value. 
Since Dewey considers the act of judgment to be directly 
concerned with values, we will not speak of aesthetic expe-
riences or objects of art as nmeansn and "ends," but in so 
~ar as they are valuable ~or experience. 
ii. Values as Instrumental and Final 
A work o~ art is intrinsically valuable, representing 
the embodiment of an achieved experience of unity or ~usion. 
1. Ibid., p. 71. 2. Dewey, AAE, p. 306. 
• 
• 
When we evaluate a work of art, we must produce evidence 
to substantiate the fact that our response is elicited 
by an object that might be genuinely valuable for others. 
"Propositions about values may be genuine propositions 
and not mere reports that a given thing is or has been 
1 
valued." We have already discussed the fact that values 
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emerge out of experiential contexts, but if they are simply 
"reportsn of prizings or desirings they become subjective, 
"impressionistic" evaluations. 
Values have an importance for future experiencing in 
that they are the objects of reflective inquiry and, as 
such, they are reinforced and substantiated by intelligent 
thought. Direct enjoyment or a feeling of satisfaction 
does not, itself, and in its immediacy, represent a valuable 
experience. To give equal status to every enjoyable and 
pleasurable experience would be to assume that all such 
satisfactions contain equal value. This is the ultimate 
fallacy of the subjectivist critic, because without sub-
sequent reflection upon the nature of the experience, there 
can be no genuine evaluative judgment. 
The term 'value' is important for Dewey because it 
denotes a significantly "had" experience, an ideal occurrence 
in our lives •. The things we continually recall and remember 
as being important junctures in our lives; these are the 
experiences which were consummatory, filled with richness 
1. John Dewey, "The Field of Values," Value: A Cooperative 
Inquirz, ed. Ray Lepley, p. 73. 
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and meaning, so that.we seek to repeat them and regain 
the original harmony which was intrinsically theirs;; :r:ather, 
in terms of their consequences for future living, "the 
1 
value of ideals lies in the experiences to which they lead." 
Yet these 'ideal experiences' were once directly "had," in 
a given moment, final in the fusion and unification of live 
creature with his environment. ··Ideals, too, have a double 
status and function. Art works have value in that they re-
veal these ideal moments of experience in embodied forms: 
Art works are valuable because they can best communicate 
those poised, enduring and significant moments of vitally 
II 
lived experience. 
Values which are inherent~ not only in works of art, 
but in the natural realm of all experienced things, are only 
gleaned through a process of judgmental inquiry. We must 
judge in order to affirm true value in experience. ttPosses-
sion and enjoyment of goods passes insensibly and inevitably 
into appraisal."2 :Valued experiences become problems, chal-
lenges to our direct responses in the sense that we want to 
know whether what we prize or dislike is worthy of our re-
spect, admiration, or disrespect. Evaluation has a dual 
function: It not on+y reinforces directly "had" experiences 
of satisfaction or dissatisfaction, giving them rational 
bases, but it may also reveal values which were originally 
overlooked, undiscerned, or merely sensed in a superficial 
l. Dewey, .AAE, p. 322. 2. Dewey, EAN, p. 398. 
.. 
•• 
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manner. The. important point is that value-judgments must 
possess this dual characteristic if they are to constitute 
an adequate criticism ·of events. They must be reports of 
directly felt qualities of meaningful experiences, substan-
tiated by rational thought which in turn transforms the ori-
ginal, unqualified response into a real value-experience for 
our lives. 
Given carings-for may have conditions of the 
kind often called "causal." If they are inves-
tigated to find out whether they are sufficient 
to warrant the particular outcome, whose anti-
cipation is the ground of a given valuing, then 
prizing enters explicitly into the class of 
events that are judgmental.l 
Once again Dewey is making a distinction for thought 
between direct 'valuings' and 'evaluative judgments.'. They 
are not different in kind, but in emphases. They are not 
identical to each other,.· but more adequately represent two 
stages in a single process of experiential critical inquiry. 
·:.:.... ··: ~.!!· ~ l· 
/ .. # 7iii. The artistic and the aesthetic 
A common error, according to Dewey, is the distinction 
;.···.:) ~.. '\ 
.. , -;-:"!. :1 ~h~ch many aestheticians, make between the meanings of the 
1.~ . 
terms 'artistic' and 'aesthetic.' It is said that the former 
denotes an active process of creating, while the latter is 
to designate a passive reception or appreciative acceptance 
of a work of art. For Dewey, this distinction can never be 
made on the basis of activity and inactivity, since the whole 
meaning of aesthetic response is intimately connected to the 
1. Dewey, "The Field of Value," loc. cit. 
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the vital, energetic response of the 'live' (active) creature. 
A true aesthetic response is genuinely recreative in terms of 
.an active and total (though not necessarily identical) percep-
tion of a spontaneous field of felt values which challenges 
the percipient to discover personal meanings as a result of 
the experience. 
The artistic embodiment of a rich experience contains 
the same materials that are the common property of all men; 
rather, it is his particular expression of them that is 
unique. The artist must perceive h~s materials aesthetically; 
he too must enjoy what he does and derive satisfaction at in-
stances in the process when he especially perceives the growing 
harmony among the elements involved. trThe artist embodies in 
1 himself the attitude of the perceiver as he works.n 
The percipient, in order to have an aesthetic experience, 
must ''create his own experience. n2 The art object, as created 
by another human being stands before others as a highly charged 
embodiment of significant meaning. Others may grasp it in their 
several diverse and common ways because of the universality 
of the raw materials and the fact that the pattern .of inter-
action portrayed involves the same characteristic relations 
as all experiencing exhibits. Both creation and re-creation 
are aspects of a process of rich experiencing, and 
without an act of recreation the object is not 
perceived as a work of art. The artist selec-
1. Dewey, ~, p. 48. 2. Ibid., P• 54. 
• 
• 
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ted, simplified, clarified, abridged and con-
densed according to his interest. The beholder 
must go through these operations according to 
his interest. In both, an act of abstraction 
••• takes place. In both there is comprehen-
sion • • • a gathering together of details and 
particulars physically scattered into an expe-
rienced whole.l 
The notion of artistic creation cannot be divorced from 
that of critical evaluation, which is directly concerned with 
values as they are experienced through formally embodied works 
of art. "Creation and criticism are companions. Genuine dis-
crimination is creative because it expresses an original re-
sponse to what is presented; it is an exercise of personal 
. 2-·~ . . .r" \ 
taste.n ; .. '\' 
''J· ·, 
iv. 
·~ ~ ::·- .,·. : . . ;··," .. 
· Fine and Pract-Uai Art 
Dewey is loath to make the. ordinary distinctions between 
works of art as 'fine,' qualified by their impractibility, and 
works of art as 'useful,' qualified by their practicality. He 
does not feel that they are identical modes of expressiveness, 
but to deny that paintings, symphonies, etc. are practical or 
significant for 'practical' living, is to deny them their 
meaning as instruments for expanding and enriching experience. 
For Dewey, "art is a continuation ••• of natural tendencies 
of natural events.n3 To dislocate art from the ordinary proc-
esses of life is to make another fallacious separation between 
1. Ibid. 
2. John Dewey, Construction and Criticism (New York: Morning-
side Heights, 1930), p. 18 • 
3. Dewey, EAN, P• 3B9. 
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intimate aspects of experiencing. 
In attempting to clarify the place of art within a total 
experiential framework of reference, Dewey speaks of aesthetic 
objects as they are value-embodiments. Fine art 
occurs when activity is productive of an object 
which affords continuously renewed delight. This 
condition r~quires that the object be, with its 
successive consequences, indefinitely instru-
mental to ~ satisfying even~s.l ' 
·' . 
.. 
This general definition may be readily applied to things which . 
have not only aesthetic,. but practical value as. wellf .. rather,. ·. 
. ·.·~ 
"any activity that is productive of objects whose perc~pti'on::· ~ •· · · · · 
is an immediate good, and whose operation is a continual ·· ·. 
source of enjo~~ble perception of other events, exhibits fine-
ness of art.rr2 
In that art objects are a fusion of useful means and 
... 
~sed materials with a formal, controlling structure; a syn-
thesis of the immediately enjoyable and the mediately valu-
able, we cannot make·a valid distinction between 'useful' 
and 'fine' art. Of course these are not identical terms, 
but much as aesthetic experience is differentiated from 
ordinary experiencing by its qualities of intensity and com-
pletion, so here the distinction is one of degree. 
When we judge works of art, we certainly cannot condemn 
them for having practical value, as, for example, a house. 
Moreover, we cannot exclude a work which is dominantly utili-
tarian from the possibility of also being aesthetically quali-
l. Dewey, Barnes, et al., Art and Education, p. 7. 
2. Ibid., P• 8. 
)' 
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fied or potential for rich experience, if it embodies com-
pletene•ss and coherence as· well as a si~nificant form. 
v. The Question of Uniqueness 
Directly related to the foregoing discussion is that dis-
tinction which aestheticians often make between aesthetic 
and other modes of experience. In this case we find people 
speaking of aesthetic experience as having a certain je ~ 
sais guoi quality of uniqueness which is not only irreducible, 
but unlike anything.else we might speak about. Here we can 
see the impressionist critic again, because if there is an 
aesthetic quality which is utterly unique, there is no pos-
sibility of establishing standards of judgment; furthermore, 
each distinct experience of an art work would be incomparable, 
a separate, isolated instance of expressed uniqueness, uniquely 
experienced. 
For Dewey, this bifurcation, like all others, is impos-
sible to make when we speak of art in terms of value for expe-
rience. 
Fine art consciously undertaken as such is 
peculiarly instrumental in quality. • • • 
It exists for a specialized use, being a 
new training of modes of perception.l 
Dewey is concernedwith the value of any concretized embodi-
ment in art not only because it punctuates the ordinary expe-
riential process with meaning but also, as a memorable or ideal 
occasion has meaningful and valuable consequences for future 
1. Ibid., p. 12. 
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perceptions in exper~ence. 
Art, as a continuation of natural processes, as it is 
lived in its richest moments of interaction between the 
creature and his environment,'is also "great in proportion 
as it is universal, that is, as the uniformities of nature 
which it reveals and utilizes are extensive and profound • 
• • 
freshly applied in concrete objects or situations."1 Art is 
neither qualitatively unique.nor is it unique in the sense of 
being unshareable or incommunicable. As we have seen, art 
works are the best means of communication, for they employ 
qualities and materials that are the constant factors of ex~e­
rience, only in a sustained, poised, final representation. 
3. The Judgmental Process 
Having touched upon the modes or tYPes of value judgment 
which Dewey considers to be distinctly fallacious, representing 
varied and harmful bifurcations, we will now discuss what 
seems to be necessary and constructive for the critical 
proc~ss of judging or evaluating. 
i. Recognition and Perception 
Art does not operate alone and without help 
from some observer. Taken by itself a work 
of art is no more than any external object. 
• • • Art works Qhallenge human beings to 
understand them.2 
1. Ibid. 
-
I 2. Kaminsky, rtDeweyts Concept of An Experience,n p. 326. 
.. 
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To recognize something is to respond to it in an habitual, 
superficial and thoughtless manner. Recognition is simply 
label-fixing; it takes place instantly and without reflection. 
Though we are recognizing things all the time, real perception, 
for Dewey, takes place only where there is insight. The dif-
ference between these two modes of observation is not only 
important for an understanding of Dewey's theory of critical 
evaluation, but also for our comprehension of basic meanings 
and values for life. 
Perception, unlike recognition, involves a nprocess 
developing in time •••• Genuine knowledge, real insight, 
. . 1 
requires work and action. Energy must be exerted.n Since 
the perception fr aesthetic objects constitutes the subject-
matter of critical inquiry, and perception itself is a process 
involving understanding, it becomes evident that Dewey is not 
concerned with constructing a superficial, vague or un-defined 
standard of value judgments. 
The distinction between recognition and perception further 
clarifies Dewey's rejection of the impressionistic critic or 
the extreme subjectivist position with regard to evaluations. 
To utter an immediate or spontaneous exclamation, of whatever 
sort, regarding a work of art is to give an unqualified impres-
sion of that work, and this is far from adequate, even though 
direct perception is necessary. This is to halt at the first 
. 
1. Ibid., P• 327. 
•• 
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stage of the process, taking what is just the beginning for 
the end; moreover, such emotional outpourings are usually 
based upon partial, insufficient grounds, expressive only 
of recognized likings, yet unperceived, unreflected values. 
To perceive is actively to digest, to have insightful and 
intelligent commerce with an object~ It is valuable fusion. 
ii. The Nature of Criteria of Judgment 
The quarrel over objectivity and·subjectivity of taste, 
while it is based on a difference of opinion regarding means 
and ends, is also founded on an erroneous conception of what 
a 'standard' really represents; moreover, Dewey does not want 
to use the ter.m 'standard' in judging values and meanings con-
tained ·in experiences of works of art. The term is confusing 
and ambiguous, due to the fact that it is usually associated 
with objective, normative, 'authoritative' judgments of taste. 
"When·· •• the word 'standard' is used with respect to judg-
ment of value objects, nothing but confusion results.n1 
Standards may be regarded as physical measures for deter-
mining quantitie·s, no:t values, of physical things. Such usage 
does not enable us to use the word 'standard' in application 
to such value judgments where the critic is concerned with 
"something original, not comparative, as in all measurement."2 
The subject-matter of aesthetic criticism is the perception 
of qualitative objects, and physically derived standards can-
not apply in this experiential context. We would have to be 
1. Ratner, p. 265 2. Ibid~, p. 266. 
• 
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very careful if we insisted upon using the word 'standard,' 
and Dewey would prefer that we speak of 'criteria' rather 
than confusing the issue with ambiguities connected with 
the diverse connotations of 'standard. ,l 
Because there are no ultimate, universally applicable 
rules for judging works of art, this does not mean that "ob-
jective cri~icism of value-objects is impossible;"2 rather, 
due to the fact that those values which are inherent in a 
work of art are common factors of experience, art being 
shareable and communicative, there must be meaningful criteria 
upon which to base valid, thoughtful judgments. The critic 
is ultimately controlled by the particular work of art as 
~ manifests certain values to him in the form of expressed 
content. "He wanders into another field and confuses values 
when he departs from the object he is studying.n3 Since the 
critic is directly concerned with the particular art object 
under investigation, he deals with objective qualities and 
not wholly with his personal expectations and feelings. How-
ever, since the ensuing criti~al judgment will be grounded in 
elements which are also components of the total aesthetic 
response, the critic will be exercising personal integrity 
in describing his final feelings. In so far as the work of 
art is re-creatively experienced, the judgment will be the 
1. Dewey, ~' p. 425. 
2. Ratner, loc. cit • 
Ibid. 
-
• 
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result of activity as well as of reflection, "The primi:l.ry 
requisite of critical ability is courage,n1 or the active 
desire to perceive fully. and richly despite the demands 
made upon concentration and renewed perception. He must 
negle~t nothing. It is an activity of originality, demanding 
of the critic that he be genuine and sincere, though his 
efforts lead him to reject other, more conventional, judg-
ments. Because of the elements of "venture .Lthe criti.£7 
reveals himself in his criticism.n2 . 
iii. Psychical Distance . l··'t 
Because our criteria of judgment must somehow be grounded 
in objective qualities, we must make certain that we avoid 
the two extreme positions of subjectivity and objectivity. 
For the contextualist, aesthetic distance is an important 
factor to consider when speaking of adequate criteria for 
judgment. An important article· on this concept has been 
written by Edward Bullough, and it would seem that this notion 
of 'distance 1 is essential for critical judgments. 
Generally speaking, distance is the ability to emerge 
sufficiently from one's own personal life to perceive the 
work of art as it exists objectively, within its contextual 
framework. One must keep his personal feelings under control 
1. Dewey, Construction and Criticism, p. 13. 
2. Ratner, loc. cit • 
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so that they blend, or are harmonious, with the experienced 
object. Moreover, 
it is distance which on one side prevents the 
emptying of Art of its concreteness and_the 
development of the typical into abstractness; 
which, on the other, suppresses the directly 
personal element of its individualism; thus 
reducing the antithesis to the peaceful inter-
play of these two factors.l 
This is the antinomy of distance; that it is at once 
personal and impersonal, direct and intellectual response, 
or object ~ subject oriented. This is one of the paradoxes 
regarding the possibility of criteria for judgments of taste~ 
If we over-distance ourselves, or completely filter the 
personal, interested attitude from our experience of an art 
object, the response cannot be aesthetic. Over-distancing 
tends to make the resulting judgment purely abstract, ana~ 
lytic and intellectual. This is to reduce the work of art 
to its components, without considering the total manifesta-
tion as it is affectually expressive. On the other hand, if 
we under-distance, or make the object too significant for 
us personally, it loses its capacity to evoke a creative re-
sponse, and we fail to notice what the object is apart from 
its direct bearing on our subjective feelings. Art becomes 
sentimental, and to the extent that we lose distance, we 
lose the appropriate perspective for adequate perception 
and critical response. "A man cannot get aesthetic value 
1. Edward Bullough, npsychical Distance, as a Factor in Art 
and an Esthetic Principle," A Modern Book of Esthetics, 
ed. Melvin Rader (2d ed. rev.; New York: Henry Holt & 
Co., 1957), p. 428. . 
·-
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out of an experience that draws upon his emotions unless he 
can maintain an attitude that will keep these emotions from 
bolting into action.n1 
There is an inevitable relativity or variability of dis-
tance concerning both tHe objective work of art and the indi-
vidual's ability to respond fully. 
Distance ••• admits naturally of degrees, 
and differs not only according to the nature 
of the object • • • but varies also according 
to the individual's capacity for maintaining 
a greater or lesser degree. 
There exist, therefore, two different sets 
of conditions affecting the degree of Distance 
in any given case: those offered by the object 
and those realized by the subject.2 
It is important for the critic, as he perceives and judges, 
to achieve the appropriate distance as that is determined 
by his own personal development and by the particular work 
of art. 
While Dewey does not explicitly speak of 'distance,' he 
does refer to 'disassociation' from personal, practical affairs 
and ends for the sake of rich aesthetic response. 
Esthetic vision involves a relaxation of a strain 
built up in pursuit of special ends so that the 
whole personality may interact freely without de-
flection or restriction so as to reach a particu-
lar and preconceived outcome. First hostile reac-
tions to a new mode in an art are usually due to 3 unwillingness to perform some needed disassociation. 
1. Pepper, op. cit., p. 66. 
2. Bullough, loc. cit., pp. 1,.09-410. 
3. Dewey, AAE, P·. 250 • 
• 
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Given the appropriate ·'disassociation' or 'distance,' 
in which case the organism can respond fully in ~he situation, 
there is more possibility that a fusion or synthesis will be 
achieved. There is a greater likelihood that harmony, unifi-
cation, balance and equilibrium will be accompanied by a more 
totally integrated relationship hetween the live creature and 
his environment. · The· achievement o£ proper 'distance' or 'dis-
association' would als-o -represent the synthesis o£ art and 
nature, as aesthetically experienced. 
iv. Analysis and Synthesis 
Critical, evaluative judgments have common £unctions to 
perform. ffThese £unctions are discrimination and uni£ication,"l 
or analysis and synthesis. 
The critic is responsible, in his judgments, to the work 
o£ art, £or an appropriate rendering o£ its due significance 
and meaning. His duty is,. initially, that o£ thought£u·l dis-. 
crimination. ttAnalysis can proceed only by going beyond the 
impression, by referring it to the grounds on which it rests 
and the consequences it entails."2 The competent critic wants 
to know why (unlike the impressionist critic) a particular 
work o£ art is immediately pleasing. In order to discover 
values inherent in a work, it is necessary to go beyond the 
casual, direct and immediate reaction to a process o£ thought-
ful consideration o£ the object. ''Judgment has to evoke a 
1. Ratner, op. cit., p. 269. 
2. Dewey, AAE, p. 310. 
.. 
.. 
. . 
. -· 
clearer consciousness of constituent parts.u1 
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Since the analytic function is discriminatory, it is 
mentally oriented, for it is the process of thought which 
enables us to go beyond the immediacy of the situation. In 
its immediacy a work of art is· it becomes valuable through _,
reflective analysis, and in the process of attempting "to 
define value • • • a process of discrimination Lfs begug! 
which implies a reflective criterion.n2 
The fact that we can refer the presen~ impression to 
'grounds' implies that there are objective elements involved, 
and that reflection, combined with synthesis, can elicit or 
produce a genuine value proposition. 
The competent critic is sensitive to the vitality of 
rich experiences embodied in works of art, and he is intensely 
interested in becoming more informed about his experiences so 
as to enhance his life and communicate values and meanings to 
others. He is sensitive to potentiality in things and objects. 
In order to discriminate in a meaningful fashion, there are 
certain conditions which must be realized. 
The critic Lmust bi/ intimately aware of a 
variety of traditions LOi7 his criticisms 
will be one-sided to the point of distortion. 
LHe wil!l appreciate the multitude of spe-
cial forms • • • the vast variety of materials 
that are usable in art. 
Unless affection is informed with the in-
sight that is the product of a rich and full 
experience, judgment will be one-sided or not
3 rise above the level of gushy sentimentalism. 
1. Ratner, loc. cit • 2. Dewey, EAN, p. 398. 
3;. Dewey; AAE; pp. 310-312. 
.. 
There are many factors which enhance the intelligent analysis 
and judgment of works of art. The above are only a few of 
them. 
Because different critics will have diverse stores of 
funded experience, varying interests with respect to medium 
and content, different educational backgrounds, and distinct 
pe~sonalities, their analytic processes will reveal different 
emphases, but in no case is selectivity unrelated to the con-
stituents of the work of art. This would be subjectivism, and 
Dewey is anxious that whatever be said about an art object 
be sufficiently controlled by the expressive object. 
Analysis and synthesis "cannot be separated from each 
other, because analysis is disclosure of part as parts of a 
whole; of details and particulars as belonging to a total 
situation.nl The work of art exists as a challenge for 
thoughtful unification, and, as such, the critical response 
is creative. Natural experience may be seen to offer a 
greater challenge to the creative imaginations of many than 
works of art, which are in themselves unified, bounded objects. 
The artist, in creating, has already selected and unified 
through formed matter, but to respond fully to this work the 
percipient must have a personally re-creative reaction. 
This unifying phase, even more than the analytic, 
is a function of the creative response of the 
individual who judges. It is insight •••• It 
is at this point that criticism becomes itself an 
1. Ratner, p. 267~ 
• 
• 
art. • • • Without a unifying point of 
view, based on the objective form of a 
work of art, criticism ends in enumera-
tion of details.l 
4. Critical ~econst~ction 
What makes the process of critical inquiry important 
for all aspects of life is that we begin to see things in 
respect to th~ir complexities and. meaningfulnesses. We stop 
having superficial relationships with merely the surfaces of 
th~ngs in our lives, ~nd we begin to tperceive' instead of 
simply recognizing, evaluB;ting the problematical so that we 
come to have firm beliefs about things, instead of just ac-
cepting our experiencing passively. Experiencing becomes 
active and volitional participation in the ongoings of our 
lives as they intersect with the natural or aesthetic environ-
ment. When we criticize, we do so for .the sake of "instituting 
and perpetuating more enduring and extensive values.n2 Crit-
ical judgments, as they npass ••• into a more and more 
generalized form • ~ • • [ariJ called philosophy. rt3 
i. The Similarity of Frocess or Method 
Because aesthetic evaluation deals with the completed 
manifestations of what Dewey calls 'real,' had experiences, 
the process of critical judgment, as a significant pattern 
for ordering and controlling, may be likened to the philosophic 
1. Dewey, AAE," pp. 313-314. 
2. Dewey, EAN, p. 403 • 
3. Ibj~d., p. 401. 
• 
• 
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method-,' The direct reason for this is that nature may be 
see~ as analogous to works of art, except for the fact that 
the lat;ter are more distinct, discernibly bounded objects, 
stable tor reflective inquiry. Through a perfection and 
unders.1;anding of our responses to works of art, or finished, 
consmmnated experiences, we may enable ourselves consciously 
to perj~orm similar operations with respect to seeing and 
experiencing·-natufeiaesthetically. Because nature is un-
bounded, presenting a broad panorama to perception, the per-
cipient must learn how to create boundaries and unify his 
experiences of interaction with his enyironment. The modes 
of aesthetic response and critical judgment give him the 
means f?r making all experience meaningful and qualitatively 
I 
aesthetic.. Thus ~ri ticism and aesthetic response are instru-
ment~l as well as intrin~ically valuable • 
. 
' Abandon completely the notion that nature ought 
to conform to a certain definition, and nature 
intrin~ically is neither rational ZPurely objec-
tiv~ nor irrational LPurely subjectivi! • • • 
it exists in a dimension irrelevant to either 
attribution. ~ ·• • ·Nature is intelligible and 
understandable. There are operations by means 
of which it becomes an objert Las a work of art 
is an objec~ of knowledge. · 
/ ' 
These ·r operations' are similar in all respects to the aesthetic 
proces13 of responsive evaluative criticism. In that art is 
treated by Dewey as a fully realized experience of nature, 
his theory and method may legitimately be extended to the 
S1J.bject-matter of existence, which i~ the subject-matter of 
philosc:>phy •. tt~very belie.f-value must be subjected to criticism. n2 
1. Dewey, QFC, p. 210. 2. Dewey, ~' p. 427. 
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The position which Dewey has taken all along imports "a 
practical element _into philosophy as effective and verifi-
able criticism.nl 
ii. Philosophy as Creative, Imaginative Reconstruction 
What we ordinarily think of as 'creation,' the bringing 
into existence of something entirely new, is not the exact 
sense in which Dewey uses the term. For him, as has been 
indicated, nothing transcends the fact of experience, and 
everything, including ideals and created objects, are poten~ 
tially or possibly or actually factors of our ~xperience. 
·Thus, the ability to create is to be seen in man's capacity 
more thoroughly to integrate his experiences. In the process 
' 
of reacting within his environment, he creates a broader and 
more extensive relationship with his world, and thus attains 
to greater degrees of personal integrity. 
In that art is simply a totally realized exper~ence, it 
also providesAa pattern of control for the imaginative venture 
of philosophy. 
For creative philosophical thinking is.for Dewey 
a genuine a~venture, and an authentic exploration. 
It is an act of the imagination. It brings to bear 
the accumulated experience of the past as a tool 
for a liberating and fruitful use of the present. 
• • • Since art as·· experience shows best what expe-
rience is, an adequate empirical philosophy must 
look at what goes on in response to art, where our 
interactions with our environment are not broken 
up and dislocated.2 
1~ ~., p. 434. 
2. Edman, op. cit., p. 64. 
e ... 
-I 
t 
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The examples of rich experience which we have ardupon 
which we may base an adequate philosophical method are most 
vividly found ~n works of art or in aesthetically,toned expe-
riences of any sort. 
Because aesthetic experience is an ideal example of the 
fusion of the past and future in the present, consummatory 
moment, it is a synthetic creation; rather, the new and the 
old, as they are freshly fused and uniquely experienced re-
presents a synthesis of creativity. So too ttan adequate 
philosophy of experience is one that like a work of art sees 
life freshly and sees it Whole.nl The fusion of means and 
ends in works of art, ih aesthetic response, and in critical 
evaluation is similar to the kind' of integrity of experience 
or life itself which is of paramount importance f;r Dewey. 
'/ Philosophy is not a special road to something 
alien to ordinary beliefs, knowledge, action, 
enjoyment and suffering. It is rather a criti-
cism, a critical viewing, of just these familiar 
things. It differs from other criticism only 
/ 
I . 
in trying to carry it further and to pursue it 
methodically ••• its disclosures follow in the 
way of pushing any investigation of familiar 
objects beyond the point of previous acquaintance.2 
Thus, philosophy as the more general critical study of 
life, is the most powerful instrument for integration, and, 
.. 
as such, its work deals with, extends and reconstructs all 
other f'acets of life and experience. 
2. Dewey,. Construction and Criticism, p. 23 • 
-• 
CHAPTER IV 
A RECAPITULATION 
We have been discussing Dewey's concept of experience 
showing its significance not only for aesthetic theory, but 
for life and philosophy in general. We have focussed our 
attention on the ordinary factors of experience and have 
' tried to show how these are high-lighted in aesthetic crea-
tion and perception. Finally, we have shown Dewey's theory 
of critical judgment both in the light of aesthetic percep-
tion and as it applies to the philosophical venture. It is 
time to recapitulate; to travel once more the main road, 
pointing to the more important and obvious 'danger signs' 
in Dewey's concept of aesthetic experience. In so doing, 
it must be kept in mind that Dewey's critics are numerous 
and that we will be unable to tap many of the available 
references. Further, it will be necessary to impose the 
limitations of time and space, and concentrate on those 
aspects of Dewey's thought which seem to be most relevant 
to our previous discussion and for the present critical 
evaluation. In so doing it is recognized that some of the 
important roads in the philosopher t s t quest·r will have to 
be by-passed. 
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1. Ambiguity and Incoherence 
Perhaps the most provocative and provoking feature 
of Dewey's philosophical writings is his ambiguous use of 
even the most crucial terms. Such terms as 1experience,' 
'nature, T 'intelligence, f tanyt experience, and tant expe-
rience are provocative in their richness of unbounded 
meaning, but provoking because they elude our grasp of 
them in any clear or concrete manner. This kind of loose-
ness in thought and writing leads the critical reader to 
say such things as the following: 
I suspect a certain pride of carelessness. Mr. 
Dewey is the champion of the natural and instinc-
tive as against the pedantic and the formally 
logical in thought and conduct. And there may 
be some connection between his general attitude 
toward life and thought and the carelessness which 
often makes him such hard reading. I am greatly 
in sympathy with many of the opinions of Mr. Dewey, 
and I recognize his very great reputation among 
American philosophers. But his extreme want of 
precision makes me uneasy - it makes me wonder1if there is something unsound about his thinking. 
While most of the critics are not so harsh or brutal 
in their judgments, it oftentimes seems as though their 
intentions do not lie far from those of the above-mentioned 
writer. Nor does he attribute the difficulties and ambi-
guities to the subject-matter of Dewey's works; rather, 
in general, the points he has to.make are compara-
tively simple ones. But my impression is that he 
has not always thought them out to a clear issue, 
and still less has he taken pains to put them in 
1. Joseph Warren Beach, The Outlook for American Prose 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1926), p. 42 • 
-• 
terms that will make them clear to his reader. 
• • • ·I cannot help suspecting that a writer 
who is constantly guilty of looseness in expres-
sion Lfack of precision and clearnes£7 in detail 
may be sometimes guilty of looseness of thinking 
in the large.l 
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We cannot but take these charges seriously, for they 
come from many other sources as well. It would seem that 
the main criticisms with respect to Dewey's ambiguousness 
stem from two major difficulties; namely, the misuse of 
terms, and the unfortunate and inconsistent mixture of 
opposing views to cement a single philosophical position. 
We will want to discuss these at some length. 
~:· 
i. Experience 
Dewey's writing is thoroughly permeated by his concep-
tions of experience. We say conception~, using the plural, 
because the word often appears to have distinct and diverse 
meanings for thought. The following quotations are but a 
few of the many possible examples we might use to illustrate 
this point. 
Experience is of as well as in nature. It is 
not experience which is experienced; but nature 
- stones, plants, animals, diseases, health, 
temperature, electricity, and so on. Things 
interacting in certain ways are experience; 
they are what is experienced:--Linked in cer-
tain other ways with another natural object -
the human organism ~ they are how things are 
experienced as well.2 
1. Ibi~., pp. 49-50 • 
2. Dewey, ~' p. 4a. 
.. 
• 
Experience occurs continuously, because the 
interaction of the live creature and environing 
conditions is involved in the very process of 
living •••• Oftentimes • • • the experience 
had is inchoate. Things are experienced but 
not in such a way that they are composed into 
~ experience. There is distraction and dis-
persion; ••• in contrast with such experience, 
we have ~ experience when the material expe~ 
rienced runs its course to fulfillment •••• 
Its close is a consummation and not a cessa-
tion. Such an experience is a whole and car-
ries with it its own individualizing qualitl 
and self-sufficiency. It is ~ experience. 
Experience becomes an affair primarily of 
doing. • •• The organism acts in accordance 
with its ow.n structure, simple or complex, upon 
its surroundings • As a consequence the changes 
produced in th~ environment react upon the or-
ganism and its activities •••• This close con-
nection between doing and suffering or under-
going forms what we call experience.2 
The interaction of organism and environment, 
resulting in some adaption which secures utili-
zation of the latter, is the primary fact, the 
basic category.3 
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In the first quotation, Deweyrs naturalism is very ap-
parent, and it must be noticed that experience may be syn-
onymous with any natural occurrence or event. It is 'nature' 
that is experienced, and 'nature' includes anything from 
'stones' to 'human organisms.t It is experience which allows 
the various objects of nature to become tlinked,T or come 
into contact, with each other. Dewey's behavioristic tenden-
cies are evident," implicitly, for 'experience, 1 as the bare 
assertion of an event, would derive its meaning from the 
physical effects or changes wrought by one natural object 
upon another natural thing or object • 
1. Dewey, AAE, p. 35. 
3. Ibid., p. 27. 
2. Dewey, RIP, P• 86. 
• 
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In the second major quotation we ·also find support for 
the notion that experience denotes interaction, but we may 
readily· mark some rather significant differences. Dewey now 
makes a. distinction between 'natural events' occurring con-
tinuously, and~ experience in the true sense. Here we 
have an. assertion of 'quality,' not simply of a bare event. 
But if 'individualizing quality' is now our criterion and 
basis for distinguishing between 'any' ordinary experience 
and 'an' experience, then it does seem that we have moved 
away fr·om _strictly naturalistic roots. Such terms as 'quality,' 
'completion,' and 'fulfillment' ·are not themselves 'things' 
or natural ·'objects;' rather, they somehow characterize such 
events or experiences.· Thus, while Dewey still uses 'expe-
rience' to designate 'interaction,' it now conveys more meaning 
than it did in the previous quotation where nothing beyond the 
mere :fact of interaction as 'event' or 'occurrence' was asserted. 
To speak of interaction is to point out a signi-
ficant but skeletal fact; experience includes not 
only the bone, but the life blood and flesh of this 
interaction. Experience is more than the abstract 
claim that there is such interaction; it makes this 
claim, but stresses all the on-going qualities, 
changes, and features which flow as consequences 
from it; consequences of vital significance to living 
and reflection.l 
Not only is Dewey emphasizing a difference in kinds of expe-
riences~, but there is a strong indication that experiences also 
differ in their degrees of significance for life. It seems as 
if Dewe1y, as he continues to draw upon this distinction, ex-
panding the meaning of ~ experience, incorporates tinges of 
1. Thayer, The Logic of Pragmatism, p. 21. 
• 
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idealism into his philosophy. That is, it becomes difficult, 
if not impossible, to discover whether Dewey wants 'qualities' 
to inhere in objects as natural properties of things, or 
if he wants them to represent mental ideas or judgments we 
make about our e~periences. We will come back to this matter 
later on in the chapter. 
The third and last major quotations give us a more dis-
tinctively 'pragmatic, 1 'instrumental,' or 'operational' 
flavoring of 'experience.~ Here Dewey's stress is on the 
'individuality' and the relativity of things, though this 
would be more apparent if we could present the whole context 
from which the quotations come. The 'organism' has its 'own 
structure,' and affects the world around it accordingly, while 
'changes produced in the environment' have their respective 
affects upon the organism. This· process of natural, affective 
change now constitutes 'experience.' Organism and environment 
are mutually 'adaptive' to each other, and the interaction 
which constitutes 'experience' is primarily a means for the 
'utilization' of the.environment in order to achieve 'security' 
for the organism. Here the crucial meaning of 'experience' 
seems to rest in the changes, or consequent adaptions wrought 
by the action and reaction of the 'live creature' and the 
environment. 
The marvelous facility with which Dewey uses. 'experience,' 
as denotative of all and everything, and then precedes to speci-
fy its application within particular contexts, obscures the 
• 
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central message he wishes to impart. Dewey provokes the 
reader because he eludes criticism almost as successfully 
as he evades consistency and coherence. He "has a habit 
of incorporating into a challenging statement something 
that blunts our objections if it does not exactly silence 
th~m.nl In this way Dewey protects himself by his very 
ambiguousness; rather, for each passage one might choose 
to criticize, he can counter with a rejoinding quotation 
from another area of his writings which might refute an 
oftentimes dangerous criticism. In order to strengthen 
and clarify his case for a philosophy of experience, Dewey 
turns his attention to aesthetics and builds upon factors 
involved in this field of study to give greater credence to 
~ experience which now comes to possess the qualities of 
art. Let us now turn our attention .to the more specific 
question of 'aesthetic experience.' 
ii. 'Art as Experience' 
Dewey seems to believe that artistic creation and 
aesthetic· response to works of art truly represent the proto-
types of that ~ind of experience which fully reveals the proper 
dissolution of distinctions; viz., between subject and object, 
means and ends, matter and form, etc. Because the field of 
aesthetics reveals such striking examples, Dewey now concen-
1. E.A. Shearer, "Dewey's Esthetic Theory," The Journal of 
Philosoahy, XXXII, ·No. 23 (Nov. 7, 1935), 626. It must 
be note that while such ambiguities make the critical 
task more difficult, it does not render it· less necessary1 
.. 
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trates more specifically on these kinds of experiences as 
being the appropriate analogies for philosophic method. 
Aesthetic experience best preserves and illuminates the 
true value and significance of real, meaningful 'experience' 
that is a synthesis of the 'live creature' and his 'environ-
ment.' Does this new perspective of 'experience' help to 
clarify Dewey's philosophy, and does he really establish 
an aesthetic theory? We must say that to both of these 
questions our answer is both 'yes' and 1no.' 
It is true that Art As Experience is the most thorough-
going expl:i,cation:~ of Dewey's aesthetic position, when we 
consider the implicit awareness of the problems and meaning 
of art for life in some of his other works. However, even 
in ~As Experience, Dewey's attention is not always direct-
ly focussed upon the issues as they strictly apply to a 
philosophy of art. He seems more concerned with using art 
and aesthetic experience as a means towards the greater 
realization of his more basic philosophy of experience. We 
may see this method employed more stringently in Experience 
and Nature, but its application is not absent in his later 
book. Dewey's major preoccupation is with Life, and we can-
not help but try to relate Art As Experience to his previous 
philosophic thinking. In the last analysis, do we get more 
out of this fine book by reading it as an exposition of 
aesthetic theory, or do we benefit more by considering it 
as the proper fulfillment of Dewey's main line of argument 
found :in his other major works? We will take the latter 
.. 
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position because it appears to be more fruitful. 
If we seek to discover a thorough-going aesthetics 
in Dewey, we will be disappointed to find that he often 
"reduces the data of esthetics to conformity with an al-
ready formed general view of life.!'1 His method is such 
that, by incorporating art into his general scheme of 
things, he not only makes it a natural continuation of 
ordinary processes, but, on the other hand, honorifically 
transforms life int'o art; that is, all life that is life 
and all experience that is .§!:!! experience becomes rich with 
. 
aesthet:tc qualities. 
But whether art merely serves the rest of life 
or becomes all that is best in life, the data 
of the esthetic problem are destroyed, not eli-
cited and interpreted •••• Lfn Experience .and 
Nature? there seemed to be a promise of an ac-
count of art that would give it special character 
despite Dewey's besetting fear that to disti~uish 
from is to separate from the rest o:f life. LY.ey 
in defense of the oneness o:f life, which he always 
finds challenged, • • • ~e makes the different into 
the identical. He reiterates his conviction that 
art is not distinctive except as perhaps it pro-
vides an especially transparent and persuasive 
illustration of what everything good essentially 
is, of what all human activity achieves, of what 
all life ·ought to be. • • • ·But under the honors 
thrust upon it art is buried.2 
We will go further than this critic and say that, despite 
the more direct treatment o:f the particular media and other 
:factors involved in artistic creation and aesthetic response, 
Art As Experience preserves the same vision o:f life and com-
municates the same central message that the above-mentioned 
1. ~~•1 Po 617 2. Ibid., pp. 617-619. 
• 
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quotation indicates. 
When Dewey applies himself to aesthetic problems, as 
he more specifically does in Art As Experience, he adds 
immeasurably to general aesthetic theory. He presents 
extremely suggestive flashes of insight which may often 
illuminate a perverse or ticklish problem for the reader. 
However, the aesthetic theory seems to be a by-product, 
and Dewey's crucial concern remains in his persistent 
desire to enrich his total philosophy o.f experience. The 
first and most obvious contribution is to a concept of 
experience, and only secondly to aesthetics as a general 
philosophical discipline. It is the aesthetician who must 
glean the valuable insights from Dewey's thoughts and 
develop them to their proper conclusions. Unfortunately, 
even this is not a simple task to accomplish, for Dewey's 
ambiguities and inconsistencies allow his thought to be 
developed in many diverse directions. One such critical 
interpretation is given by Stephen Pepper, who attempts to 
build what might be considered as a 'pragmatic' aesthetics. 
iii. Contextualism 
We have already pointed out the merits which the term 
'contextual' has with respect to Dewey's concept of aesthetic 
experience. Persistent in a methodology which will unite 
theory and practice for the greater realization of an integrated 
life, Dewey is mainly concerned with the union of elements 
in particular contexts. An experience represents the richest 
• 
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Coherenqe and the kind of organic unity which makes the 
total work of art such that no single factor could be re-
moved and nothing could add to its perfection are the things 
which the organicist looks for in his critical work of eva-
luation. "The qualit}r of organicism (the individual, or the 
characteristic) is the coherent whole developed from the in-
ternal relations of the affective materials.n1 
'Quality' is very important in Dewey's aesthetic theory, 
but to be consistent ~th a pragmatic approach, the true 
realization of a quality would lie in the awareness of ~ 
experience directly had, even though this experience be es-
sentially incoherent.• Yet in Dewey's emphasis on the har-
mony, fusion, and unity of aesthetic experience we get a 
real indication that coherence and meaningful organization 
of all constituent factors is essential, and that ~ expe-
rience cannot be a conflict situation which is not resolved 
in this manner. That is, within a given context, Dewey is 
often explicit in his', demands for a harmony of internal 
relations. A work of, art and §E:. aesthetic response to it 
must be such that val~e and meaning are intrinsic to such 
a harmony or fusion of elements within the particular con-
text. In other places, where Dewey speaks of the 'emotional' 
quality which pervades ~ experience and gives it its unique-
ness and individuality, he seems again to touch upon organic 
matters. Though each context is unique and has its own in-
trinsic value, it does so only because of the 'fusion' or 
1. Ibid., p. 379. 
.. 
.. 
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type o:f context • 
' It is Pepper's contention that Dewey tries to combine 
two incompatible theories, and that "even though the insights 
o:f the one can o:ften be adjusted to the :framework o:f the other, 
this can only be acco~plished with considerable alterations 
or with loss o:f prestige to the .insights in question."1 The 
basic insights belong·to two distinct aesthetic theories, the 
'organistic' and the Jcontextualistic.' While Dewey, :for the 
most part, advocates the latter, he o:ften slips imperceptibly 
into an organistic position. The criticism which Dewey must 
:face is why, i:f two intuitions are basically valuable and yet 
incompatiqle, must you combine them rather than discuss each 
separately? Pepper's own method is to deal with :five :funda-
mental positions, comparing and contrasting them with respect 
to basic aesthetic problems. 
The organistic c~itic is primarily concerned with a work 
o:f art as an 'organic:whole;' that is, a total, coherent 
expression (or experience) in which the constituent parts 
are internally related. There is signi:ficant unity achieved. 
"It :follows that the process o:f elucidating or o:f comprehending 
or o:f adequately seei~g into experience consists in making 
explicit out o:f the fragments o:f experience as we originally 
:find them the implicit coherence that lies there."2 The 
critic must discover, creatively, the inherent unity in art. 
1. Stephen C. Pepper, "Some Questions on Dewey's Esthetics," 
The Philosophy of John Dewey, ed. Paul A. Schilpp, p. 372 • 
2. Ibid., P• J7Jo 
• 
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Furthermore, value is proportional to the degree o£ coherence 
achieved in an experience or a work of art. 
Pepper discusses several other facets of organicism in 
relation to contextualism, but for our purposes this one point 
is sufficient to illustrate Dewey's inconsistencies. He 
states: 
An experience has a unity that gives it its 
name • • • con$tituted by a single quality 
that pervades the entire experience in spite 
of the variatiqn of its constituent parts. 
• • • No experience of whatever sort is a unity 
unless it has ~sthetic quality •• ; • I have 
spoken of the 7sthetic quality that ro~nds out 
an experience ~nto completeness and un~ty as 
emotional. • • :. f!.n!fl in every integral expe-
. rience there is form because there is dynamic 
organization. • • • The form of the whole is 
••• present in every member •••• An object 
is peculiarly and dominantly esthetic, yielding 
the enjoyment qharacteristic of esthetic percep-
tion, when the factors that determine anything 
which can be called an experience are lifted 
high above the threshold of perce£tion and are 
made manifest for their own sake. 
The characteristic which now distinguishes . .§!!!. experience from 
any ordinary event or occurrence is a unity which is pre-
dominantly of an emotiqnal quality. The integrity of an 
experience is represented by form, structure and organization. 
This organization is 'dynamic' because, as Dewey takes the 
temporal ebb and flow of events and things quite seriously, 
he believes that every experience expands and develops in 
time. 'Coherence' is ~ital for Dewey, as evidenced by the 
following: 
1. Dewey, AAE, PP• 37,: 40-41, 55-57. 
• 
.. 
An experience has esthetic quality; otherwise 
its materials would not be rounded out into a 
single coherent experience. • • • The real work 
of an artist is to build up an experience that 
is coherent in: perception while moving with 
constant change in its development. · · 
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When Dewey is not :speaking directly of 'coherence,' the 
word 'integrity' seems :to hold the same essential meaning. 
I 
Again, if Dewey has an'absolute, it would be the integrity 
of Life, and we might easily stretch this and other implica-
tions to a philosophy of the 'Coherent organization of Life.' 
A work of art as a fully integrated experience has intrinsic, 
individual worth and value, and it is 'lifted above the thresh-
old of perception.' This certainly does not sound like the 
f 
same Dewey who spoke o$ experience as a 'means for the greater 
utilization of the env~ronment for the greater security of 
the organism.' Moreov~r, it does not sound like a Dewey who 
makes an important distinction between 'recognition' and 'per-
ception' and calls the !latter 'true insight.' Rather, ~ 
experience, embodied i~ a work of art, becomes important and 
valuable in and .for itself, and it would seem that this is 
now true regardless o.f the awareness of the percipient. Per-
ception does not seem quite as necessary for ~ experience to 
become actualiz~d, and ,:a work of art is its own excuse for being. 
It possesses its value intrinsically, and this value does seem 
to be proportional to t~e amount or degree o.f integrity of 
means and ends, form and content, and most important, the artist's 
experience appropriately expressed • 
1. Ibid., pp. 54-55, 51. 
• 
.. 
102 
The unity that makes !!!!_ experience possess aesthetic 
quality is dominantly,an emotional factor, as we have already 
indicated. This is crucial for Dewey's aesthetic theory, and 
because his use of 'emotion' contains certain ambiguities for 
thought, we must give it careful attention. 
2. The Emotional Mode of Response 
Among the various modes of response, such as the prac-
tical, the intellectual and the volitional, it is the emo-
tional aspect of expe~ience which Dewey considers to be the 
most pervasive in aesthetic creation and response to works 
of art. It is through; our emotions that we initially become 
alive to problematic sltuations, or experiences which are 
potentially rich for vital and active transformation. 
An emotion is to or from or about something 
objective, whether in fact or in idea. An 
emotion is implicated in a situation, the 
issue of which is in suspense and in which 
the self that as mpved in the emotion is 
vitally concerned.l 
We are emotional; emotlons are 'implicated in situations;' 
and, an emotion seems to come ~ something objective. 
Again, Dewey nseems to oscillate between three, or at least 
two, quite distinct views, which cannot easily be made con-
sistent with one another.n2 Nor is it merely a question of 
a verbal difficulty with respect to 'emotional quality' which 
distinguishes sn aesth~tic experience from ordinary experiences. 
1& Ibid., p .. 67 • 
2. Eliseo Vivas, Creation and Discovery (New York: The 
Noonday Press, 1955), p. 223. 
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The verbal difficulty \is there, but besides this there seems 
to be a real defect in. Dewey's conception which produces 
diff'iculties for the r:eader. 
In one place Dewey states that emotion "is not what 
is expressed. Without emotion, there may be craftsmanship, 
but not art; it may be. present and be intense, but if it is 
directly manifested th~ result is also not art.nl 
And yet, in innumerable passages - too many to 
give • • • exhaustively - Dewey perplexes his 
• • • reader by statements like the following: 
In cases of' inspiration, the emotion called out 
by the original material which engages the artist's 
interest "is modified as it comes to be attached 
to the new material" - that is, as it comes to be 
"attachedn to the artistic product which is the 
result of the artist's creative activity. A page 
f'ollowing this, statement ••• tells us that what 
the artist possesses over the ordinary man "is the 
capacity to work a vague idea and emotion over into 
the terms of s0me def'inite medium." And in the next 
page, ••• emotion is aesthetic "when it adheres to 
an object formed by an expressive act." ••• Some-
where else we are told that emotion is "inf'ormed" in 
the material. Obviously the use of words like "at-
tached to," "adhere;" "attend," "denote," "work into," 
"inf'orm," would indicate that, in conf'lict with the 
statement above quoted to the eff'ect that emotion 
is not "~is expressed," art d~es have at least 
in part, emotion for its content. 
We have already discussed at some length a third view, that 
emotion is the "cementing f'orce 11 of artistic activity and 
aesthetic response, so we will confine our attention to the 
other two meanings. The basic question is: Where are we 
to seek that emotion which Dewey claims is at the very root 
1. Dewey, AAE, p. 69. 
2. Vivas, p. 224. The author makes reference to Dewey's AAE, 
pp. 74_, 76, 238-239• 
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of aesthetic experienc~? 
' 
Dewey does manage~ to by-pass the notion that emotion 
is the pleasurable reaption evoked ~y a work of art in the 
percipient; however, hr is never precise about the nature 
of emotional quality which distinguishes an experience from 
ordinary experiencing k.nd makes the. interaction between 
creature and environme~t peculiarly 'aesthetic.' Because 
of his usual method of, dissolving distinctions we.might 
almost s~y that·· 'emotion'· seems to denote the tone or 
character of a particu;l.ar experience, but this does not 
really help us clarify1 Dewey's inconsistent use of the 
term. 
For example, if emotion is that which 'colors' or 
i 
I 
1 dyes' the whole experience of artistic creation and aesthetic 
, ~ I • 
response, then emotion,~ be constant and p~rv~d;i.ng through-
! 
out the entire process! ·of experience. . However, it would seem 
. ' 
that emotion might well be absent and a work of art still 
r 
produced and enj~yed in some other, equally significant manner. 
The artist might prod~ce with great difficulties and strain, 
suffering-throughout ~he duration of creation, conscious, 
I 
I 
above all, of the end !in sight, considering the means worth 
the struggle. He migHt approach his task without significant 
emotional involvement ,with a dominantly clear and rational 
eye towards the end which he must express. Dewey seems too 
optimistic in his. empl{asis on emotion as 'cementing,' as 
m~king the experience ,harmonious and highly fused with 
aesthetic quality. He· seems to forget his old stress on 
.. 
the necessity of conflict, the problematic situation in 
which ttemotion is the conscious sign of a break, actual or 
impending ••• the discord ••• that induces re.flection."1 
Here emotion is aroused because o.f a tensional situation, and 
even though the environment is directly implicated it would 
seem that it is the creature who .feels emotional stirrings 
because of his existential predicament. And yet, emotion 
as the pervasive aesthetic quality renders the experience 
a harmony, a .fusion, and is not, properly speaking, an 
aspect of the self involved, but the primary characteristic 
o.f the total situation. Emotion here is more a .fact o.f the 
whole objective situation. It initially prompts or stirs 
the creature to action and thought, but is never absent 
from the process o.f utilizing means towards .fulfillment 
or completion, and at the end o.f ~ experience, it is 
'emotion' once again which characterizes the total situation. 
We can only postulate that, .for Dewey, no distinction 
can be made, and emotion is all of these things, however 
dissimilar they might appear to be; rather, "the uniquely 
distinguishing feature o.f aesthetic experience is exactly 
the fact that no distinction o.f self and object exists in it,n2 
and 17it is aesthetic in the degree in which organism and environ-
ment cooperate to institute an experience in which the two are 
so fUlly integrated that each disappears.n3 
1. Dewey, AAE, p:'. 15. 
3. Ibid. 
2. Ibid., p. 249 • 
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In such a fully integrated experience, must we not 
say that the self and the object as distinct and separate 
disappear or are taken up into the synthesis of ~ expe-
rience? In such a case 'emotion' as the peculiar quality, 
character or tone of the total context would apply, but 
we still have Dewey's use of the term as 'inhering' in the 
object, as the expressed content, as an objective factor 
in the experience. We are also left with subjective emo-
tion, and how can such emotion be aroused in a percipient 
throughout the duration 1 of an experience when the self ha,s, 
' in fact, fully disappeared as a discrete, separate entity. 
Further, if emotion is ~hat which 'changes' and must be 
i 
flexible within a proce$s of experience, must we not be 
conscious of its operations and work towards its appropriate 
culmination as expressed content? Dewey makes it sound as 
though emotion, intellect and volition simply function 
naturally and accordingly as the situation unfolds rather 
than presupposing a strong awareness of purpose and a 
conscious fulfillment o£ real intention. The self as pur-
posive, conscious and active seems truly to disappear, and 
What we are left with at the end is ~ experience to which 
all else is sacrificed. And finally, if the experience it-
self can tell us nothing about the total situation, the 
self is. lost to knowledge of reality and can only know in 
isolation from real living. The experience is the primary 
category, and though the. self is necessary for .§:!!. experience 
to take place, even the self gets its meaning from such 
-• 
-
a synthetic event. 
Dewey never seems ;to distinguish between 'emotion,' 
'feeling,' and 'objective characteristics' in a work of 
art and in aesthetic experience. If' emotion is truly an 
i 
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aspect of the total experience when the self disappears as 
I 
a discrete entity, then' it becomes a quality of an objective 
experience. If, on the, other hand, emotion is a state of' 
the self when the environment contains obstacles or becomes 
an aspect of tensional interaction, then we must investigate 
feeling-states of' the organism to discover what emotion 
really means. If Dewey:wants 'emotion' to denote all of 
these things he o~ght to clarify his concept more rigidly, 
and perhaps use the word less broadly to preserve its central 
meaning. In its prese~t, rather ambiguous state, 'emotion' 
is perplexing to the point where it loses meaning and signi-
ficance in the effort to clarify it as an aesthetic term. 
', 
Finally, Dewey see~s not only optimistic about the 
arousal and pervasive f~ctioning of the 'emotion' in creative 
activity and response, but overlooks what seems to be an empiri-
cal fact, that emotion is not universal to such experiences. 
That all experiences de~ignated 'aesthetic' are emotional 
in tone, or that when we reflect upon an experience we find 
'. 
the pervasive quality a~d character to have been emotional, 
seems to be stretching a point and ignoring relevant evidence 
to the contrary. That the creative process may be highly 
rational, conscious and .intentional use of' materials towards 
a predetermined and des:i;red end, with the artist as the 
.. 
108 
purposive and 'cementing' force is badly missed in Dewey's 
analysis. That a resppnse to a work of art may be pre-
' 
dominantly analytical and intellectual, though not indif-
i 
ferent to qualities and feelings is also lacking in Dewey's 
concept of an aesthetic experience. That analysis itself 
can provide an extremely rich aesthetic experience to parti-
cular aspects of a work of art seems to be ignored. Only 
when the self is stripped of its own interests and thoughts 
may it enter, and so l~se itself, in an experience. In this 
respect, though Dewey claims to consider all the relevant 
evidence, he does not ~arry his empiricism far enough; rather, 
in ignoring certain important features of the self and of 
diverse kinds of experiences, he limits ~ experience so 
that it becomes a rare\phenomenon, highly specialized and 
uniquely characterized• That different people may enjoy 
such rich experiences in diverse manners and because of 
a multitude of reasons .and psychological factors seems 
neglected by Dewey in his efforts to explain what, for 
him perhaps, constitutes such ~ experience. 
Though the concept of an experience is rich, it might 
I -
! 
well be further enriched by a more thorough empiricism and 
by the philosopher's dropping his own particular biases 
and allowing any facto~ to dominate the experience so 
long as it has the quality of completion and fulfillment. 
Furthermore, this finality so vital to §:!! experience might 
well be a kind of intellectual satisfaction of the theoretic 
• 
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impulse, for this too might be seen as a sort of aesthetically 
qualified or 'toned' experience. By incorporating a strong 
note of objectivity in'his concept, Dewey violates the 
relativism which seems!essential to his total philosophy. 
The two strains do ~ot mix well and end by weakening the 
central position . 
Dewey's major int~ntion, to strengthen and enrich a 
concept of experience, 1 is a valuable one, and in so far 
~s he concentrates on truly important aesthetic issues, his 
suggestiveness is truly stimulating and provocative. There 
is a great deal to be ~leaned from Art As Experience that 
would stimulate furthe~ work in the field, a greater interest 
in aesthetic questions; and even a richer.awareness of the 
potentialities of nature, art, and life itself. Dewey does 
not employ his energie~ on unimportant or superficial issues, 
nor does he reiterate qn older position which has been well-
considered by other thinkers. He displays the same kind of 
courage which he considers to be so important for the criti-
cal work of reconstruction and creativity, and in so doing 
he makes the aesthetic 'problems live with a new kind of 
vitality and significance. This kind of work is never 
fruitless or a waste of time and thought, for it forever 
may act as a means towards a greater realization of the 
centrality of aesthetics and its crucial import in the 
field of philosophy. ]hese things are part of Dewey's in-
tention, and here he succeeds without doubt and with great 
• 
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skill. Even in a negative sense, by provoking the reader, 
Dewey stimulates the natural dialectic of thought and keeps 
the issues burning and alive. For this work alone he might 
well be praised. 
However-, we would:not be scrupulous and alert if we 
did not mark some of the more obvious shortcomings in 
Dewey's thought and writings. Just as he sometimes speaks 
of emotion as 'feelings' or 'sensations,' and other times 
as 'objective characte~istics' or 'content' of a work of 
i 
art, and still at other times.as the 'quality' pervading 
~ experience, he also is inconsistent in his use of 'in-
tellect' and 'volition.,' Though we do not have time to go 
into these at length, we might notice that the work of the 
intellect is sometimes ~limited to strictly pragmatic or 
instrumentalist concerns, in selecting means and choosing 
particular materials for organization; yet, at other times 
Dewey speaks of 'purpos'e, ' of the intelligence as being 
capable of a kind of i~tuitive faculty for grasping form 
and structure and subsequently, of guiding and controlling 
the process of creativi[ty. There are almost two distinct 
levels of intelligence, and often it seems as though the 
' 
pragmatic or operational function serves the higher faculty 
of true intelligence, r~al perception or insight. If this 
be the case, and it certainly seems applicable, then there 
is something other than: pure change and process in Dewey, 
something real beyond particular meaningful experiences 
• 
• 
• 
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which we are able, somehow, to know. The 'unity, t 'fusion, T 
or 'fulfillment' which is crucial to having~ experience 
rings with the notes 'of stability, harmony, and equilibrium 
1 
which seem incompatible with Dewey's other emphases on 
continuous change, d~velopment and the endless flow of 
events. We must investigate what seems to verge on the kind 
of dualism which Dewey tries so persistently to avoid. 
3. The Problem of Unity 
' 
Dewey attempts to replace 'truth' with meaning, but 
particularly in his discussion of judgment certain problems 
arise. While he insi!sts that meaning and validity are 
~ 
experientially verified, when we make an assertion about 
a work of art, or ju~e its value, this statement must be 
significant for us now, and not depend, for its meaning, 
on future experiencing. It may be that our future expe-
! 
riences will alter piesent judgments, but that is not to 
r 
say that such present': assertions must wait upon the juture 
for confirmation of m~aning. FurthermorE?, we usually know 
what we mean when we say something, and what we think we 
know we ordinarily believe to be true of the situation. If 
we didn't, then Dewey's discussion concerning the possibility 
of agreement among different people regarding a work of art 
becomes rather meaningless. He is explicit in finding objec-
tive characteristics ~nd common focusses of attention in works 
of art. These things havE? meaning in and by themselves, and 
we can judge them rightly or wrongly. Surely if art is the 
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perfect example of ~ mode of communication of value, that 
value must ~ something. The intrinsic value of a work of 
art might well lie out~ide the experiential context, even 
though our awareness of it does depend upon personal inter-
- ' 
action and astute crit~cism. As Blanshard says, "most men 
i 
' believe that .reflective thought can concern itself with 
' 
things that fall outsiqe their own, or indeed anyone's expe-
, 
rience.ttl Although De~ey would, for the most part, deny this 
! 
and refer thought to ex,periential changes and differences 
in live affairs, the perception and achievement of value in 
unity does seem to represent something quite distinct. 
For example, a conpept, according to Dewey, must make 
' 
a difference in terms of future activities or experiencing, 
and difference implies change, but what kind of change is 
involved? Dewey is never entirely explicit or consistent about 
this, but what seems sttiking in his discussion is the impor-
tance of an actual 'transformation' of the qualitY:, the tone 
or the value of life. ~rther, when we look at actual quota-
tions in Dewey we are apt to find three different answers 
given to the question o~ 'what changes' through experiences 
of value. ttThe first would deny that reference beyond presented 
' data was possible at all; the second would hold that it is possi-
ble, but is limited to individual experience; the third would 
extend the reference to :the experience of others.n2 
1. Brand Blanshard, The Nature of Thought, Vol. I (New York: 
.. The Macmillan Co., t955), p. 367. 
2. Ibid., p. 368. 
• 
• 
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All of these answers are explicit in Dewey's writings, 
yet we are advised not to think about 'differences,' and so 
the philosopher converts the different into the identical 
and blurs all distinctions in a supreme effort to keep from 
entertaining a dualistic epistemology. The question remains: 
Does such an attempt, involving ambiguities and inconsistent, 
J 
blurred conceptualization, clarify thought and really dissolve 
distinctions, and thereby dualism? 
If .§:!!. experience is a unity, inclusive of subject and 
object, which synthesis serves as the object of judgmental 
inquiry, how can we, being intimately involved, ever observe, 
reflect, or know anything about such experiences? What is it 
that actually constitutes the 'objective characteristics' of 
an aesthetic experience if we are ultimately unable to separate 
form and content, subject and object, etc. in the only true 
sense of analyzing the experience gua unity or fusion of all 
constituent factors?. If analysis is only able to give us 
certain limited distinctions, then we must be aware that the 
unity, the total experience is somehow greater than the sum 
of its parts, if we are able to reflect sufficiently upon 
the constituents. The reality of ~ experience is elusive 
and ineffable, and nothing, either separately or altogether, 
which we may abstract for thought will tell us of this reality 
as a unity. But what is it that constantly eludes thought 
and analysis and yet is the supreme value for Life? Is there 
no other way we may know the unity of SQ experience than by 
abstract, insufficient thought or direct 'seizure?' 
• 
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i. The Fallacy of Artificial Simplification 
We have already discussed at some length Dewey's polemic 
against traditional thought and any philosophy which sacrifices 
a thorough-going empiricism to a preconceived bias for some 
one answer to all important questions. As he says: 
This bias toward treating objects selected because 
of their value in some special context as the "real," 
in a superior and invidious sense, testifies to an 
empirical fact of importance. Philosophical sim-
plifications are due to choice, and choice marks 
an interest moral in the· broad sense of concern for 
what is good. • • • We are constructed to note and judge in terms of ••• value. Acknowledgement of 
this fact is a very different thing, however, from 
the transformation effected by philosophers of the 
traits they find good (permanence, unity, etc.) into 
fixed traits of real Being. The former presents some-
thing to be accomplished, to be brought about by the 
actions in which choice is manifested and made genuine. 
The latter ignores the .need of action •••• 1 
But doesn't Dewey do exactly this same thing with his concept 
of unity or fusion? Does he not make a distinction between 
any ordinary experience and set apart ~ experience because 
of its qualities of completion and unity as being somehow 
more meaningful and hence more real or valuable for life? 
What is reality, for Dewey, if it is not real experiencing, 
and what can be more real than the having of an experience 
regardless of what may happen in the future or has happened 
in the past? Once had, ~ experience is at least 'fixed' 
in memory and ideal in terms of future hopes and expectations. 
If there was not some stabi~ity beyond the actual experience 
itself, what value would there be? Value has extensive reference 
' to futur~ life, but not because it was had in experience as 
much as the fact that the having left us with something signi-
1. Dewey, EAN, pp. 27-28. 
I 
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ficant, whether we call it greater integrity of personality 
or a richer unity o£ life in terms of the relationship be-
tween the 'live creature' and the environment. 
In setting of£ ~ experience and distinguishing it from 
ordinary experiencing, Dewey uses words such as 'unity,' 
'£usion,' 'fulfillment,' 'completion,' 'harmony,' and 'equili-
brium.' These 'qualities' become so important for his philo-
sophy of experience that he tends to ignore his previous 
interest in tension, stri£e, suffering, and unbalanced, pro-
blematic situations. These latter seem to become the means 
towards the achievement o£ unity and an integrated li£e, and 
surely such unity is not had and then lost, but additive; that 
is, we never become the same individual we were after ~ expe-
rience, for greater value and integrity of Li£e itself has 
been achieved. This changes the very quality of our existence, 
but change now has a direction and purpose of sorts, and if 
this is true there must be something Real towards which we 
may direct that activity which is so essential to Dewey. It 
does seem rather obvious that as his thinking about experience 
progressed, Dewey made certain choices, selected aesthetic 
experience as most representative and most real or valuable, 
and committed the same £allacy for thought and li£e which he 
so harshly condemns in other thinkers. Not the integration of 
conflicts and tensions, but of harmonious unities is stressed 
in Art As Experience, though the former would seem to be more 
in keeping with his strain of pragmatism and naturalism. 
• 
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ii. The Permanence of!Value 
By dwelling so pe~sistently upon stability, harmony, 
balance, and unity, Dewey indicates that ~ experience has 
value because of these qualities rather than those denota-
i 
tive of change and imp~rmanence. The fact that ~ experience 
is a 'consummation,' a successful close of a situation, rather 
than a 'cessation' furt.her indicates that value is intrinsic 
to the experience, and need not find its meaning in the future. 
I 
The evaluative judgmenti of ~ experience does seem to be inde-
pendent of its 'working,' out in the future, or distinct from 
its instrumental worth.: It would seem that, for Dewey, there 
! 
is real value and meanihg intrinsic to ~ experience regardless 
of its practical, operapional function for future experiencing. 
"I suspect that at;bottom Dewey is as little enamored of 
I incessant change and relativity in the world of judgment as 
anyone.n1 This comment' receives quite a bit of substantiating 
evidence through passag~s where Dewey speaks of 'purpose,' 
'value' and stabilit~through unified integration of creature 
and environment, though': these two terms are so broad as to 
include anything whatso~ver for which there is evidence. In 
speaking about Peirce, Dewey 
dwells approvingly on Peirce's idea of reality: 
"Reality, n he says, "means the object of those 
beliefs which have after prolonged and coopera-
tive inquiry become stable! and truth is the 
quality of thoser beliefs. tr;G 
1. W.E. Hocking, "Actiqn and Certainty1 " The Journal of Philo-
sophy, XXVII, No. 9 :(April 24, 1930 J , 233. 
2. Ibid. 
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But what can Dewey mean by a belief ttbecoming stable?" 
A similar question might be asked with respect to the unity 
i 
or distinctive quality of an experience which sets it off 
I -
from any other form or mode of experiencing. Whatever it 
is, it must remain throughout the duration of the experien-
tial or contextual situation. It must have some kind of 
stability which allows it to pervade the changing, developing 
course of events and still endure as that which makes the ex-
perience communicable~ potentially available to recreative 
; 
response. A work of ~rt has real stability and meaning. 
! 
Dewey often speaks of this quality as the "emotional" 
characteristic of ~ ~xperience, but he is not thoroughly 
: 
' 
consistent, and we ar$ easily misled. What ~ seem to 
j 
act as a permanent co~e in all such experiences is the 
I 
intrinsic value which,they have for life. As such, value is 
stable, despite the varieties of form and structure, the rela-
! 
tive content and organization of experiences. Nothing is 
static, but it would ~eem that no amount of change can des-
troy ideal values whic~ are always aspects of potentiality 
in the environment and in man, and may be realized when any 
experience takes on tne characteristics and qualities of ~ 
experience. Thus, th~ world remains pregnant with potential 
value and meaning so that life can and ought to take on real 
significance. 
i 
Hocking speaks of Deweyrs "uncovered .§:. priori ••• an 
element of knowledge which shells out of our changing empirical 
judgments as somethin~ implicitly presupposed and invariant.n1 
1. Ibid., P• 235. 
.. 
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Hocking finds this ~ priori element or ninvariant value • • • 
[a.iJ .•. the value o:f trying to realize value."l Empiri-
cally speaking, Dewey would want to insist that value, con-
ceived in terms of its.experiential context, is factual and 
I 
variable according to the particular context of experience 
I 
and the changing environment. What Hocking seems to be sug-
, 
gesting is that regard4ess of a particular situation's fac-
! 
tuality, there remains 
1
an enduring or permanent pregnancy of 
intrinsic value in any 'tsituation; namely, the value of seeking 
to bring into concrete :experience that which is only potential 
fact. More fully, it iJs the value ttof discovering the possi-
I 
bilities of the actual :and striving to realize them.n 2 
I 
The universe beco~es an arena for the realization of 
possibilities and potentialities that are already given as 
factual, thou~h only their realization may be considered as 
I 
real. An experience be'st captures and preserves such realized 
- ! 
values for human existep.ce, and it has aesthetic quality; that 
., 
is, it is impregnated w~th tones of completeness, finality, 
I 
and coherence. What we! know, for Dewey, would be the enor-
mity of the potentialit~es in experience, but we know these 
things on the basis of bur past experiences, particularly 
those aesthetically had: value-able experiences. Thus, we 
might see that Hocking is suggesting that in Dewey there is 
intrinsic value to inquiry, for only by reflecting upon our 
past experiences are we', able to realize the 'realization of 
value' had. 
1. Ibid., p. 236. 2. Dewey, QFC, p. 304. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
Throughout our discussion of Dewey's aesthetic theory 
we have found that aesthetic experience enriches a general 
philosophy of experience and becomes meaningful in its own 
right as a type of org~nically consummated event occurring 
amidst the continuous process of living. We have seen that, 
for Dewey, while art i~ a natural continuation of natural 
processes, it has the pniqueness of being what all experiences 
can and ought to be if' life is fully lived. Rather, life as 
aesthetically or artistically lived would be a representation 
of the full realizatioh~of all experiential potentialities, or 
a life constantly re-abtualized. Aesthetic experience has a 
t 
kind of unique value, ~ince all experiencing does not possess 
' I 
the same organization bf content and qualitative richness of 
: 
meaning. However, much as this would seem to be the case, 
it would be inconsiste11t with Dewey's desire to dissolve all 
distinctions between the various aspects of life, for exam-
, 
ple, the practical and the theoretical, etc. By focussing 
' . 
his attention on the differences between any ordinary expe-
; 
rience and~ aesthetic experience, Dewey violates his own 
methodological princip~es. While such a violation results 
in the positive enrichment of a significant and meaningful 
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interpretation of aesthetic experience, it does so only at 
the expense of a consistent employment of method which, at 
the same time, ironically subjects him to the charge he most 
earnestly wishes to avoid, namely, that of making distinctions 
and bifurcations within experience. 
The concept of ~ experience has been found to raise some 
rather thorny problems with respect to: a) intrinsic quality; 
b) the emotional mode of response; c) value. 
We have suggested that Dewey has set off ~ experience 
from any experience with the stipulation th~t ~ experience 
has an intrinsic quality of unity or.coherence. This important 
aspect of an experience is ultimately ineffable and is a char-
acteristic of the experience, though, at the same time, it is 
itself not directly experienced. Dewey speaks of quality both 
as though it were a factual occurrence·and in terms of ideal 
value. We have raised the question of whether or not this 
intrinsic quality could be more adequately interpreted as the 
value experience of a purposive subject rather than as a mere 
characteristic of a subject-less situation. 
It is the emotional aspect of experience which Dewey 
considers to be the most pervasive feature in aesthetic 
creation and response to works of art. His use of the emo-
tional quality as a differentiating factor between an expe-
rience and ordinary experiencing does not adequately perform 
this important function because of his lack of precision in 
defining the term and his inconsistency in its application. 
Furthermore, he is never clear about whether emotion is evoked 
• 
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in the subject ]X an object, or inherent in the work of· art 
as objective content. Whatever it may be, he is consistent 
in one respect, namely, that it is the distinguishing and 
pervasive quality.of an experience. We have been suggesting 
that Dewey uses emotion in at least two quite distinct man-
ners: as an aspect of the total, objective situation, and 
as a state of the self when the environment contains ob-
stacles or becomes, in some way, riddled with problems 
for the organism to resolve. Here we might further sug-
gest that a more rigid clarification of this term and a 
less extensive use of it would greatly enhance its value 
as an aesthetic concept. The fact that Dewey often indi-
cates that any emotional tone or characteristic would 
qualify "anytr experience· as "an" experience indicates that 
the concept is of crucial importance for his aesthetic 
theory. Yet, at the same time, while it would seem that 
any emotion would qualify experience as aesthetic (e.g. 
fear, sorrow, distress, anxiety, and the whole range of 
this mode of response), Dewey often restricts the appli-
cation of emotion only to those intensely satisfying 
feelings of harmony, unity, and restored equilibrium. 
His shifting and changing intentions are not only per-
plexing, but tend to mislead the reader. 
Moreover, Dewey's concern with emotion as a pervasive 
feature of an experience in Art As Experience seems to depart 
.. 
12Z 
from his interpretation of emotion as an initial and subjec-
tive factor of problematic situations and tensional inter-
actions as developed in earlier works. The alteration of 
this concept succeeds in accomplishing the tasks set down 
for it as a factor in aesthetic experience, but leaves sus-
pended its meaning for his total philosophy of experience. 
These considerations lead directly to the difficulties 
inherent in Dewey's development of a theory of aesthetic 
value. For Dewey, aesthetic value is synonymous with the 
meaning or significance of ~ experience. The criteria for 
significance are, we suggest, inconsistently developed and 
applied, especially when we consider the changes in Dewey's 
dominant themes from the earlier works to their appearance 
in Art As Experience. 
In different parts of his philosophical writings, Dewey 
seems to develop three theories of significance or meaning 
which are incompatible. These may be referred to as psycho-
logical immediacy, individual relativism, and public assent. 
The first amounts to a denial of any standards of judgment 
with respect to aesthetic creation and response, and hence 
assumes a scepticism with regard to aesthetic value. The 
second, while recognizing communication, interaction, and 
reference of a sort, fares little better as regards the 
development of any stable standards of aesthetic value 
between individuals and cultures. The third, perhaps, re-
presents Dewey's final intentions and certainly constitutes 
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the implicit and explicit criterion in Art As Experience. In 
this book he ~ suggest that people can come to agree not 
only about the objective constituents of a work of art, but 
also about the quality which gives it its unique and peculiar 
meaning and value. This does not necessitate such agreement 
nor does it eliminate a certain amount of inevitable cultural 
and personal variations and relat·ivity. 
We have found Dewey insisting that aesthetic value is 
intrinsic to ~ experience and necessitates, in no way, re-
ference to future experiencing. Primarily and essentially, 
meaning lives in the context of the present moment as an 
experience is ~· But· we find a strange twist in Dewey's 
theory of aesthetic value, for we realize that we have "had" 
~ experience only by subsequent reflection upon past expe-
rience and never when we are having the experience. Again,· 
it would seem that~ experience,as part of the subject's 
realization or conscious awareness, is never had, but in-
volvement must always be a matter of continuous participation 
in developing potential towards such fulfillment. Experiencing 
becomes always a means to an end that is itself never expe-
rienced, namely, value in consummation. 
The question remains: Does value grow out of a value-less, 
factual situation or is value inherent potentially within the 
natural framework of organism and environmental interaction? 
If the former is the case, by what emergent magic can that 
which is essentially indifferent to value itself become the 
-·· 
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arena £or realization of value? If the latter is Dewey's 
intention, then the universe is a reservoir of potential 
value, and Dewey can, by this interpretation, be rightfully 
placed within an historical framework. In this sense 
Dewey carries £orward the interpretion of art 
that extends £rom Aristotle and, with an in-
creasingly defined emphasis on the creative 
character of the imagination, through Hegel, 
Schopenhauer, and Nietzs~he to Croce and Berg-
son. For all these thinkers art shapes fluid 
experience into form and helps us to realize it 
in its individual character; it makes what fol-
lows after follow on, what lies together, hang 
together, and so gives character to scene and 
situation. That Dewey is in a tradition and 
helps to define that tradition is so much the 
better •••• 1 
Finally, many of the criticisms levelled at Dewey's 
aesthetic theory are concerned with the serious question o£ 
whether, in the last analysis, Dewey does not subsume his 
aesthetics under a moral, ethical theory or a metaphysical 
world viewo In short, does his aesthetics become a means 
rather than an end when we explore its implicit and explicit 
suppositions? According to one such critie2 Dewey does make 
his aesthetics serve the more crucial end o£ an ethical 
theory, and the Rractieal, highly pragmatic question which 
emerges is: What is the good life, and how may I live in 
order to attain the greatest amount of qualitative value 
through li v:ing? According to many other critics, Dewey's 
1. Shearer, "Dewey's Esthetic Theory," p. 663. 
2. See~., pp. 617-627 • 
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Art As Experienca is more adequately interpreted as a meta-
physics than as a philosophy of the arts; that is, it deals 
with questions concerning the nature of reality, which, for 
Dewey, is ~xperience. In this sense, aesthetic experience 
marks a qualitative difference in kinds of experiences; that 
is, it distinguishes some as more real than others, but the 
basic category always remains Experience, and this is a 
metaphysical, not an aesthetic category. We mightsay that 
Dewey used poor judgment in calling the book Art As Expe-
rience, rather than Experience an~ Art, making it a natural 
continuation ~f Experience and Nature. 
In this paper, we have been suggesting that the more 
fruitful interpretation of Art As Experience is as it contri-
butes to Dewey's entire philosophy of experience. We have 
asked that the reader consider it not merely as an aesthetic 
theory, but also as the culmination of an ethic and a meta-
physic. 
' 
'· 
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ABSTRACT 
Dewey's aesthetic theory represents the culmination of 
his general philosophy of experience, and might best be in-
terpreted as the final statements of his socio-ethical 
theory and his metaphysical world-view. Art As Experience 
is not only Deweyts explicit statement about art and aes-
thetic experience, but a further enrichment of his crucial 
concept of experience. This enriched focus upon expe-
rience enhances its significance and meaning only at the 
expense of certain distinctions and ambiguities with respect 
to terminology and method. In making a fundament& distinc-
tion between any ordinary process of experiencing and ~ 
aesthetic experience, Dewey seems to violate what, for him,, 
is a basic methodological principle. To distinguish is to 
make an unnatural bifurcation; moreover, to select one thing 
as more meaningful and valuable than another is to commit 
the fallacy of artificial simplification, or to tear some-
thing out of context and give it an unnatural superiority 
over all else. Yet, this is precisely what Dewey himself 
does with respect to the quality of ~ aesthetic experience 
in distinction to ordinary experiencing. The latter is 
characterized by incompleteness and distraction, so that a 
richly consummated, final, and closed situation is never 
attained. The former represents real and vivid transaction 
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between the organism and its present environment, and is 
characterized by harmony, completion, unity, and the achieve-
ment of' value f'or lif'e. Of' course, any experience has the 
necessary potential f'or becoming ~ aesthetic experience, 
f'or the latter is only a natural continuation of' natural 
processes. The pattern of' organization and the constituent 
£'actors are similar; rather, the dif'f'erence is to be seen in 
the qualitative aspects of' completion and the unity attained 
through successful readjustment and renewed, expanded rela-
tionships. 
A work of' art is the concrete embodiment of' just such 
~ experience. It is suspended or held still in its embodi-
ment, so that any percipient may recreatively respond, and 
thereby have a similar kind of' qualitative experience. In 
this respect, art works represent the prototypes of' what 
experience can and ought to be, and are also the highest 
means f'or communicating such richly had experiences. 
An experience is initially rooted in the existential 
predicament of' man f'acing a natural obstacle or problem in 
his environmental context. While the f'irst stirrings are 
emotional feelings of' unrest and tension, the process of' 
achieving. renewed equilibrium is possible only through the 
concomitant functioning of' the intellect, which guides and 
selects materials, and the volitional mode of' response, which 
incorporates purpose and strength~ the plan. However, it 
is the emotional aspect which .is flexible. and pervades the 
• 
• 
whole with its unique qualitative coloring and, Dewey would 
suggest, it is this factor which, in subsequent reflection, 
may be seen to have· dominated the whole experience. !n 
experience becomes a coherent organization of sorts, bound 
by a thread of continuous emotional quality, whose active 
and persistent presence we may only realize after the fact 
of having an experience, though its operation is continuous. 
We might suggest that· the internal relatedness of the 
various modes of response in artistic creation and aesthetic 
response, as well as the element of coherence and pervasive 
unity of quality might well be interpreted as an organistic 
view of aesthetic experience, inconsistent with Dewey's main 
line of argument in his earlier works. What happens is that 
the instrumental, highly pragmatic notion of truth and meaning 
as a property of future experiencing becomes subordinate to 
a rich notion of intrinsic unity, with value as an immediate 
property of experience. 
The basic problem which emerges as a result of this 
hypostatization of ~ aesthetic experience is that value, 
as it is realized, is never rat~onally discernible; moreover, 
Dewey is insistent upon the fact that only in subsequent re-
flection can we analyze and know the meaning which an expe-
rience h~s had for our lives, and even reflection cannot give 
us everything we might know. Life is forever deeper than 
logic or reason, and must constantly elude our total grasp 
of it in any other than, perhaps, a feeling or intuitive mode 
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of response. However, it becomes more and more apparent 
that, for Dewey, reflection is the only way we are able 
to apprehend meaning and value. It becomes a moral impera-
tive not only to strive to realize the richness of poten-
tial value in the world, but to become aware and conscious 
of the meaning embodied in aesthetic experience • 
